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ABSTRACT 
Each branch of the federal government has changed substantially since its 
creation in 1789. Today, the people directly elect both houses of Congress and citizens 
hold the President more accountable for his actions. The federal judiciary has grown as 
well. The third branch of government may have started as a fairly weak tribunal, but 
during the early national period it grew to an equal branch of government. The Justices 
redefined the judiciary by their own actions. They worked to amend the circuit riding 
requirements, adopted a new style of opinions, and asserted the authority of judicial 
review. Through primary evidence, this thesis will show that the actions of the Justices 
moved the Supreme Court forward, and not the cases brought to the Court, which some 
of the secondary literature suggests. 
During the early years of the Supreme Court, each Justice had to attend two 
Circuit Courts as well as the Supreme Court. The traveling involved proved arduous and 
strained not only the Justices' professional lives, but also their personal lives. The issue 
of circuit riding also posed problems for the execution of justice. While sitting on the 
Supreme bench, Justices reviewed their own decisions from the Circuit Court. To ease 
the burdens from both these problems, the Justices sought relief through Congress. The 
Justices lobbied Congress and persuaded them to pass both the Circuit Court Act of 1792 
and the Judiciary Act of 1793. 
The adoption of a new opinion writing style enhanced the authority of the 
Supreme Court by giving it a unified voice. Chief Justice John Marshall understood the 
political climate of the early nineteenth century. He knew that if the Court wanted to 
maintain authority they could no longer speak separately through seriatim opinions. The 
"opinion of the Court" allowed the Court to use a single voice, which gave a single 
message to the lower courts. This style of opinions also gave Marshall the opportunity to 
leave his mark on the history of the Court. 
The establishment of judicial review secured for the Supreme Court a position as 
a branch of government. Judicial review gave the Court the final word on constitutional 
matters. The Court became the defender and protector of the United States Constitution. 
The Court gained this authority over the course of many years. Delegates debated the 
issue at the Constitutional Convention, framers urged its importance during ratification, 
and the Court itself created precedent. Finally, in 1803, the case of Marbury v. Madison 
cemented the Court's authority of judicial review. 
Almost one hundred years later, in 1925, the Supreme Court reinforced its 
position as a branch of government. Under Chief Justice William Howard Taft, the Court 
urged Congress to pass the Judiciary Act of 1925. By this Act, the Supreme Court 
became a court of discretionary jurisdiction. This means that the Court gets to decide 
what a constitutional question is. 
The Supreme Court of the twenty-first century has a much different appearance 
than the Court of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. From its marble 
home adjacent to the Capitol, the Justices interpret and declare the law of the land. The 
actions of the justices of the early national period brought the Supreme Court from a 
weak tribunal to a branch of government. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Adjacent to the United States Capitol stands the icon of American justice - the 
United States Supreme Court. Atop the building centered on the facade rests a banner 
declaring "Equal Justice Under Law." Inside, visitors are greeted with the Great Hall, 
which leads to a magnificent courtroom. From this room, nine justices interpret the 
United States Constitution and declare the law of the land. These depictions of 
prominence represent the United States Supreme Court of the twentieth century. 
However, does the same description fit the Court of the early national period? If not, 
what did the early Court look like and how did it become an equal branch of government? 
The powers of each branch of government have varied throughout history. At 
different times in United States history, the executive and legislative branches have each 
tried to assert their authority over the other. The federal judiciary has also changed over 
time. However, the judiciary did not experience the same fluctuation as the other two 
branches. I argue in this thesis that the federal judiciary has moved steadily in the 
direction of becoming stronger through the actions of the justices themselves, which 
created precedents and statutes that further defined their role as an equal branch of 
government. The justices ushered in this new definition by changing the requirements of 
circuit riding, adopting new opinion writing practices, and the establishment of judicial 
review. A century later, the Supreme Court, under William Howard Taft, confirmed its 
authority as a branch of government through the Judiciary Act of 1925. 
2 
The United States Constitution establishes the building blocks for the United 
States government. Article III focuses on the judicial branch of government. Unlike 
Articles I and II, which set up the legislative and executive branches, Article III is short 
and ambiguous. The Founders gave the Court a general direction by laying out a few 
jurisdictional lines. They also called on Congress to create a federal court system, with a 
Supreme Court as its top tribunal.1 
After the states ratified the Constitution, the first Congress met in 1789. On this 
occasion, the members of the Senate assembled a committee to organize the judiciary. 
Senators Oliver Ellsworth, William Paterson, and Caleb Strong made up the core of this 
committee and did most of the organizing.2 The work of these men, along with their 
committee colleagues, produced the Judiciary Act of 1789.3 With the passage of this act, 
the United States Supreme Court in its original form came into being. 
The Supreme Court defined by the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not have the same 
appearance or stature that the Court today enjoys. The Judiciary Act of 1789 called for 
six total justices, one chief justice and five associate justices. 4 Today the Court consists 
of nine total justices. The size has expanded due to congressional enactments and 
1u.s. Constitution Article III. 
2Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, vol. I of The Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 
458-459. 
3 Judiciary Act of 1789, S. 1, 1st Cong. (1789). 
4Bemard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
16. 
custom. During the early years, the Court met in New York, Philadelphia, and later 
Washington D.C. Finally, in 1935, the Court moved into its current quarters. 
Chapter II explains both the methodology and the historiography of the thesis. 
The section pertaining to methodology discusses how the research was conducted. The 
research began by reading the secondary ~iterature to see what questions still remain: 
Then, the research moved into primary sources in search for the answers. The section on 
historiography lays out the arguments of earlier historians. This section also presents 
much of the primary material. 
3 
Chapter III explores the issue of the justices of the Supreme Court riding the 
Circuit Courts. The job description of the justices, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
illustrates one of the major differences between today's Court and the early Court. The 
Judiciary Act of 1789 required the justices to attend two circuit courts as well as hold two 
sessions of the Supreme Court of the United States annually. The justices of the first 
Supreme Court began to feel the hardships of travel, which caused some of the early 
justices to resign and take up other careers. John Jay, the first Chief Justice, identified 
the burden of travel as one of his reasons for resigning his post. Justice Thomas Johnson 
also applied the same reasoning. Johnson had only been a member of the Court for a year 
when he wrote "I cannot resolve ... to spend six Months in the year of the few I may 
have left from my Family .. . "5 
Why was the removal of the duty of riding the circuit important to the growth of 
the Supreme Court? There are two answers to this question. Of lesser importance, it 
5Schwartz, History of the Supreme Court, 19. 
4 
made the job more appealing. Justice James Iredell, a member of the early Court, took 
measures into his own hands. He supported the idea of the justices rotating the circuit 
assignments. When the issue came before the Supreme Court, the senior members 
argued only the federal legisl~ture had the authority to create such a change. In disgust, 
Iredell, with the help of a relative in the United States Senate, wrote a piece of legislation 
which called for the rotation. This bill, the Circuit Court Act of 1792 became law on 
April 13, 1792. 
A year later, in 1793, the Justices once again prompted legislative action. The 
Judiciary Act of 1793 lessened the burden of travel on the Justices from two circuits a 
year to only one. Before the Judiciary Act of 1793, justices resigned their positions 
because the work seemed unbearable. Before 1800, twelve different men served on the 
Supreme Court, including three Chief Justices. Also during that time, four members of 
the Court resigned from their positions. This pattern indicates that the Court membership 
was unstable. The Judiciary Act of 1793, along with other events in Court history, 
stabilized the Court's membership by making the job more appealing. 
More importantly, the exemption of circuit riding also freed the justices from the 
ethical battle they faced when their own rulings came before the Supreme Court. During 
the early national period, most cases came to the Supreme Court through a "writ of error" 
from the Circuit Court. Justices then faced the decision of whether to recuse themselves, 
meaning to not participate, or hear the case again. Justice Iredell presented the ethical 
argument of William Blackstone. Blackstone believed that a judge cannot remain 
impartial in the area of his residence, which termed "prudent jealousy." The entire Court 
followed the direction of Iredell in the remonstrance written to Congress. The justices as 
a whole did not believe they should correct the errors they made while serving as a 
Circuit Court judge once the case c~me before the Supreme Court. 
5 
Chapter IV focuses on the Supreme Court's opinion writing practices. Justices 
sought to strengthen the Court by changing the opinion writing practices. Courts speak 
differently than the other branches of government. When Congress or the President want 
to make a statement, they may use multiple media. Even in the late eighteenth and. early 
nineteenth centuries this was the case. For instance, members of Congress or the 
President had the ability to make passionate speeches appealing to the emotions of the 
people. This avenue has never been open to the Supreme Court - or any other American 
courts. Courts must speak through their opinions and back up their statements using legal 
arguments and case precedents. 
When the Supreme Court first began to hand down decisions, the justices 
delivered their opinions in a manner that would seem awkward and confusing to a 
modem audience. During the early years, 1789-1800, the Court issued its rulings in a 
"seriatim" fashion. This meant that each of the justices wrote his own opinion in each 
case. This model of seriatim opinions came from their English for~fathers. 6 The King's 
Bench in England delivered its opinions using the seriatim form of opinion writing. Also, 
justices presented their opinions differently. Under this system, the least senior justice 
6George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815, 
vol. 2 of The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States (New 
York: MacMillian Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), 382. 
presented his opinion first and the most senior issued his last.7 When using the seriatim 
form of opinion writing, each case had the possibility of having six different opinions. 
This presented the difficulty of deciding which opinion held the most weight, thus 
rendering the voice of the Supreme Court weak and unreliable. 
6 
Chief Justice Marshall built upon Oliver Ellsworth's idea of "per curiam" 
decisions when he implemented opinions for the court into his Court's decision making 
process. 8 The difference between per curiam and opinion for the court is that the author 
is recognized for an opinion for the Court. Another is that Marshall changed the mode of 
deliverance. Previously, under the rule of seriatim opinions, justices gave their opinions 
in an inverse of seniority pattern, but under Marshall and the opinion of the court, the 
most senior justice in the majority wrote and delivered the decision. This practice 
enhanced the Court's authority by giving it a unified voice. 
Along with affording the Court a single unified voice, the change in opinion 
writing practices also protected the Court from political opposition. Marshall understood 
the political climate of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He recognized 
that the change in political leadership would directly affect the judiciary. Before the 
election of 1800, federalists such as George Washington and John Adams controlled both 
the presidency and congress. This federalist influence ensured that the members· of the 
Supreme Court would generally favor the federalist agenda. The election of 1800 
completely turned the tables. Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams for the presidency, 
7 Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 751; More infonnation can be found in Kennit Hail, 
Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 608. 
8Haskins and Johnson, Foundations of Power, 383. 
and Jeffersonian Republicans flooded the halls of Congress. With a political majority in 
Congress, Jefferson could now fill vacant Court seats with his own ideological allies. 
Marshall sought to prevent a divided Court by changing the opinion writing practices. 
7 
No longer could the minority's voice of opposition carry the same weight as the majority. 
The decisions handed down by the Supreme Court using the new style of opinions 
provide evidence for the authority gained by the Court. Marshall used this new style to 
leave a stamp on the history of the Court. With the touch of a pen, Marshall and his 
associates defined the Court's jurisdiction, upheld national supremacy) and pronounced 
federal contract law. The Supreme Court defined both its original and appellate 
jurisdiction with Marbury v. Madison and lvfartin v. Hunter's Lessee. Marshall's Court 
asserted national supremacy through its decisions in McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons 
v. Ogden. Lastly, the Court defined the national contract law with its decisions in 
Fletcher v. Peck and Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 
Chapter V studies the development of judicial review. The Supreme Court used 
its newly found voice to further define its role in government. The United States 
Supreme Court has not always been known as a court that answered questions of 
constitutionality of laws. The authority to answer such questions stems from the practice 
of judicial review. Although judicial review would not be fully established until the early 
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court built the foundation for such a doctrine much 
earlier. 
Documents left by the framers of the Constitution suggest that the ground work 
for judicial review had been laid by the time ofratification. The founders revealed their 
8 
attitude toward judicial review in ratification speeches, the Federalist Papers, and other 
essays urging the ratification of the Constitution. The very documents that originally 
defined the Supreme Court, the United States Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
allude to judicial review. The Court itself dealt with judicial review before Marbury v. 
Madison, when it heard cases dealing with state laws and their constitutionality. At least 
three such cases came before the Court before Marbury: Ware v. Hylton, Hy/ton v. United 
States, and Calder v. Bull. 
Each of the above mentioned cases posed a constitutional question the Supreme 
Court. Both Ware v. Hylton and Calder v. Bull called the constitutionality of a state law 
into question. The case of Hylton v. United States asked the Court to decide the 
constitutionality of a federal statute. Although the Court did not declare an act of the 
federal congress unconstitutional, the fact that the questions came before the Court shows 
at least some of the founders and early justices believed the Court had the authority to 
answer such questions. 
The formal establishment of judicial review, however, came as another product of 
the Marshall Court. The case of Marbury v. A1adison allowed the Supreme Court to 
establish judicial review in 1803.9 By declaring section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
unconstitutional, Marshall defined an essential role of the Supreme Court. Marshall's 
opinion, along with its acceptance by the President and legislature, guaranteed the right 
of judicial review for the Supreme Court. 
9William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Revised and Updated (New York: Vintage Books, 
2001), 27. 
The epilogue, the final chapter, illustrates how Marshall and his contributions 
made a lasting impact on the judiciary. One hundred years after the death of the great 
Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court fully embraced the identity the early 
Court strived for with the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925. In 1921, William 
Howard Taft became the Chief Justice of the United States. Taft admired John Marshall 
and his accomplishments. He once said that "[John Marshall] made this country ... 
Marshall is certainly the greatest jurist America has ever produced, and Hamilton our 
greatest constructive statesman."Io Taft prioritized judicial reform, which he tried to do 
as president, but failed. I I With the goal of judicial reform in mind, Taft began to draft 
the Judiciary Act of 1925, which became known as the Judges' Bill. 
The Judiciary Act of 1925 also serves as another example of the Justices taking 
charge and creating the changes which strengthen the Supreme Court. After becoming 
Chief Justice, Taft assembled a committee consisting of himself and four associate 
justices to write the legislation that became the Judges' Bill. Justices George Sutherland, 
Willis Van Devanter, James McReynolds, and William Day each sat with the Chief 
Justice on the committee. After they produced a document, Taft personally introduced 
the bill to the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee.• The involvement of the 
justices did not end there. Taft and the Associate Justices working with him went to 
9 
10Archie Butt to Clara, Washington, D.C., February 27, 1910, in Taft and Roosevelt: The intimate 
Letters of Archie Butt Military Aide, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1930), 293-
294; Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 
259-260. 
11Merlo J. Pusey, "The "Judges' Bill" After Half a Century," Supreme Court Historical Society 
Yearbook (1976): 55. 
Capitol Hill to lobby members of Congress. Taft even went further and actively 
corresponded with Senator Stanley of Kentucky, urging him to support the Judges' Bill. 
10 
Before 1925, the Supreme Court heard many cases due to a mandatory 
jurisdiction, especially cases dealing the constitutionality of statutes or cases with the 
potential for capital sentences. 12 These cases were appealed to the Supreme Court 
through a writ of error. A writ of error asked the Supreme Court to review the ~ction 
taken by the lower court and correct any error of law that might exist. The Judiciary Act 
of 1925, the Judges' Bill, changed the protocol for appealing to the Supreme Court and 
gave the Supreme Court discretionary jurisdiction. This legislation made the writ of 
certiorari the main avenue to the Supreme Court. The discretionary jurisdiction gained 
by the Court through this Act gave the Court a new sense of authority - the right to 
decide, not only the answer to constitutional questions, but what a constitutional question 
IS. 
The Supreme Court of the early national period certainly did not appear or act the 
same as the Court today. Each of the subjects mentioned- circuit riding, opinion writing, 
judicial review, and later the Judges' Bill - show how the actions of the Justices created a 
stronger and more authoritative Court. In the following chapters, the federal judiciary 
will go from a weak tribunal to a branch of government. 
12Jonathan Sternberg, "Deciding Not to Decide: The Judiciary Act of 1925," Journal of Supreme 
Court History, vol. 33, no. 1 (2008): 5. 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The Supreme Court of the United States faced many challenges during its first 
fifty years of existence. The early Justices and other early judicial luminaries left many 
primary documents for historians to try and piece together the puzzle of the Court's 
development. Historians have utilized some of these sources producing a collection of 
secondary sources. Nevertheless, the secondary literature pertaining to the early Court 
years remains fairly small compared to other areas of the Court's history. 
11 
For this project, I have chosen to employ more or less traditional methods of 
historical research. I began by reviewing the secondary sources to gain an understanding 
of the larger picture surrounding the early judiciary. The survey of the secondary 
literature generated questions which challenged the current historical claims. Then, I 
turned to the primary sources in search of answers to these questions. Throughout the 
project, I used many different kinds of primary sources such as, speeches, letters, 
opinions, legislation, and other legal documents. Preserved speeches delivered by the 
founders convey their feelings toward the judiciary. The Justices wrote to each other 
regularly and expressed their feelings to each other in this correspondence. Opinions 
written by the Justices show how the strength of the Court has grown. Legislation, such 
as the Circuit Court Act of 1792 and the Judiciary Act of 1793, shows how the Justices 
actively sought to strengthen the Court. The primary sources, coupled with the secondary 
12 
literature, have allowed me to present my argument on how the Court eventually became 
a co-equal branch of government. 
The secondary literature pertaining to circuit riding offers a broad understanding 
of the issue, but to understand its deeper effects on the Court dipping into the primary 
sources is essential. The Documentary History of the United States Supreme Court, 
edited by Maeva Marcus, presents a wealth of ~~imary sources. In these volumes, 
correspondence between justices, formal documents sent to Congress, and pieces of 
legislation show how the justices' actions further defined the role of the judiciary. Both 
Chief Justice John Jay and Associate Justice Thomas Johnson expressed strongly 
negative feelings toward circuit riding in their resignation letters. Those who remained 
on the bench privately praised the relief brought by the Judiciary Act of 1793 through 
personal letters, as Justice William Cushing did to Justice William Paterson. The 
remonstrance to Congress, sent by the justices, shows the unanimous disapproval of 
circuit riding. The legislation passed by Congress indicates that the Justices could 
collectively persuade the legislature. 
Earlier historians have grappled with these same issues - circuit riding, opinion 
writing, and judicial review. However, historians have generally not shown the justices 
creating a stronger judiciary. Histories of the United States Supreme Court are often 
organized by the succession of Chief Justices. Bernard Schwartz, for example organized 
his History of the Supreme Court in this fashion. For each named Court, Schwartz used 
the cases to show how the Court changed through history, rather than focusing on the 
actions taken by the Justices. However, he also referred to some of the same issues 
13 
mentioned above. He wrote about the disgust the justices felt toward riding the circuit. 
However, Schwartz did not argue that the actions of the justices further defined their role 
in the United States government. Recent histories of the Supreme Comt often show how 
' . 
the cases decided by the Court increased its strength. 1 _ But they pay little attention to the 
other aspects of the Court's history. 
Another historian, Bruce Ackerman, argued the justices of the 1790s did not have 
any constitutional misgivings about circuit riding.2 He painted the picture of a Supreme 
Court facing a new problem when circuit riding became an issue again during John 
Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice. The primary sources, discussed above, offer a much 
different interpretation of the Justices' views toward circuit riding. The resignation 
letters, remonstrance to Congress, and other documents show that the Justices did have 
major constitutional qualms about circuit riding. 
Julius Goebel, on the other hand, went to the other extreme and produced a 
magnificent history of the early federal judiciary - volume one of the Oliver Wende Ii 
Holmes Devise: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801. Throughout his work, Goebel 
gives detailed explanations of many different facets of the early Court. He discusses the 
creation of the Court, riding circuit, and early Court decisions. This book also offers 
several primary sources applicable for any study on the origins of the federal judiciary. 
1Bemard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
2Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of 
Presidential Democracy (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 164. 
14 
Although Goebel wrote an extensive history of the early Court, his book acts more as an 
encyclopedia than a monograph. 
Unlike circuit riding, the topic of opinion writing does not have a vast collection 
of primary sources. Interestingly, Marshall did not leave any primary sources ~xplaining 
why the change of opinion writing practices took place. However, the opinions written 
by members of the Supreme Court show the difference between the two styles. The 
"opinion of the court" uses more direct language and the absence of other voices gives 
the decision more authority and stature. For example, Justice William Paterson ended 
his opinion for the Court for Stuart v. Laird with "Of Course, the question is at rest, and 
ought not now to be disturbed."3 
The historical debate pertaining to the changing opinion writing styles remains 
fairly small. Albert Beveridge, the most thqrough Marshall biograph.er, argues that 
Marshall changed the opinion writing practices all on his own. His four volume 
biography of Marshall offers a thorough background on Marshall, thus promoting a clear 
understanding of Marshall's political and judicial philosophies. He claims that Marshall's 
experiences in the Revolutionary War, especially at Valley Forge, planted in him the 
importance of a strong central government. 4 This belief in a strong federal government 
gave Marshall the passion that he needed to change the practices of the Supreme Court 
3 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U. S. 299, 308. 
4Albert J. Beveridge, Frontiersman, Soldier Lawmaker 1755-1788, vol. 1, The Life of John 
Marshall (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), 146-147; Leonard Baker, John Marshall: A Life In 
Law (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1974), 46. 
and make its voice stronger. Beveridge claims that Marshall changed the practice with 
the first case his Court decided- Talbot v. Seeman. 5 
15 
Richard Ellis's The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young 
Republic, also provides key information for the argument made in this section. Ellis puts 
the issues Marshall faced as Chief Justice in their historical context. He shows how 
Marshall would have understood these issues. This is evident in his discussion on how 
the cases of Stuart v. Laird and Marbury v. Madison worked together to achieve one goal. 
The same idea holds true in the case of opinion writing. Marshall knew the Court faced a 
real possibility of losing a political cohesiveness unless the change in opinion writing 
practices mitigated the negative effects of a politically divided Court. 
George Haskins and Herbert Johnson wrote volume two of the Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Devise: Foundations of Power: fohn Marshall 1801-.1815. Much like. volume 
one, Haskins and Johnson's work reads like an encyclopedia. The authors show how the 
United States Supreme Court moved from issuing seriatim opinions to opinions of the 
court. They explain how during the Ellsworth years, the Court tried to issue opinions 
using "per curiam" decisions, but that an opinion with a single voice did not become the 
norm until the Marshall Court years. 
Primary sources concerning judicial review show how justices used the 
foundations laid down by the founders and their own sense of authority to establish the 
right of the United States Supreme Court to answer constitutional questions. The primary 
5Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801); Albert J. Beveridge, Conflict and Construction 1800-1815, 
vol. 3, of The Life of John Marshall (Boston: Houghton.Mifflin Company, 1919), 16. 
16 
sources confirm that the idea of judicial review emerged much before Marshall, just as 
the secondary literature mentions. Framers of the Constitution argued for judicial review 
by giving speeches to ratification conventions, writing essays, and legislation. During 
ratification, Oliver Ellsworth wrote the "Letters of a Landholder,"6 which he used as a 
medium to express his ideas toward judicial review. Alexander Hamilton's Federalist 
787 also conveys the idea of judicial review. A case can be made that the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 harbors judicial review in section 25 of the document. 
Judicial review has also prompted a great deal of debate amongst historians. 
Historians generally agree that the establishment of judicial review took place under 
Marshall's leadership of the Supreme Court. However, debate exists as to how the issue 
came to a head during the early nineteenth century. Some historians argue that judicial 
review developed as a brilliant response to the political culture, while others argue that 
earlier precedent gave Marshall the ability to confirm judicial review, and still other 
historians argue that the Supreme Court innately had the right of judicial review. 
Albert Beveridge, in volume 3 of his biography of Marshall, argues that Marbury 
v. Madison needs to be put in its historical context. He argues that Marshall would have 
rather used judicial review to declare the 1802 Repeal Act unconstitutional, but used the 
cases of Stuart v. Laird and Marbury v. Madison to save the judiciary from an attack by 
the other branches. Beveridge also asserts that Marshall would have been familiar with 
6Paul Leicester Ford, Essays on the Constitution of the United States, Published During its 
Discussion by the People 1787-1788 (Brooklyn, NY: Historical Printing Club, 1892), 159, 184. 
7 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist, Robert A. Ferguson, ed., 
(New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2006), 427-435. 
17 
works such as the Federalist, but that those documents alone did not support Marshall 
while deciding Marbury. 8 Richard Ellis in The Jeffersonian Crisis agrees with 
Beveridge, that a contemporary debate over judicial review took place prior to Marshall. 
Ellis argues that before Marshall issued his opinion in Marbury each of the three 
branches believed that it had the authority to interpret the Constitution for itself. 
R. Kent Newmyer, in his book John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme 
Court, depicts judicial_ review as a process built upon earlier precedent. Although he does 
not mention the cases by name, Newmyer wrote how the Court had answered questions 
of constitutionality concerning state laws. He even mentions Alexander Hamilton's 
Federalist 78 and how Marshall would have read and thoroughly digested Hamilton's 
views.9 Newmyer claims that judicial review did not begin with John Marshall, but that 
Marshall had cleverly used the idea to keep the integrity of the Court intact without 
assaulting either of the other branches of government. 
William E. Nelson also wrote about the origins of judicial review in his book 
Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review. Nelson mentions that 
the framers debated judicial review during the convention and ratification period, 
however, does not go into detail about the sources available from that era. He also 
8Albert J. Beveridge, Conflict and Construction, 119 and 130. 
9 R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2001 ), 171. 
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neglected to discuss the cases preceding Marbury. He brushes over the case of Hylton v. 
United States, and does not even mention Ware v. Hylton or Calder v. Bull. 10 
George Haskins and Herbert Johnson present the idea that judicial review had 
been an innate power given to the Supreme Court by the framers of the Constitution in 
their Holmes Devise volume. They agree with those who have argued that Marshall's 
opinion in Marbury v. Madison cemented the doctrine of judicial review. However, they 
also agree that judicial review had been understood legally before the time of Marshall. 
Haskins and Johnson date the premise of judicial review in colonial times. Also similar 
to Newmyer, Haskins and Johnson deploy Federalist 78 and other evidence to support an 
early knowledge of judicial review. However, unlike Newmyer and Beve~idge, Haskins 
and Johnson argue that judicial review can be found in the Constitution itself. They point 
out that Article III, Section 2 states that the authority of the federal couqs "' shall extend 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, ... ' and, further, that the 
Supreme Court 'shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, ... "' 11 This 
statement seems to give the Court a broad authority. 
The early Supreme Court decided cases that dealt with constitutionality of both 
state and federal laws before Marshall. The primary material also suggests that not all 
members of the federal judiciary fully accepted Marshall's declaration of judicial review 
authority. Judge Gibson, a Pennsylvania judge, sided, in an opinion he.wrote, with the 
10William E. Nelson, Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review (Lawrence, 
KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 2-3, 37. 
11 George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-
1815, vol. 2 of The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States 
(New York: MacMillian Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), 186. 
argument that each branch should interpret the Constitution on its own. However, the 
opposition from both the President and Congress to Marshall remained minimal as the 
Court gained the authority it sought. 
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Lastly, historians showed how the justices confirmed the Supreme Court's role as 
a branch of government developed during t~e early years, while further ~xpanding the 
Court's authority with the Judiciary Act of 192_5. Merlo Pusey, in his article "The 
'Judges' Bill' After Half a Century," discusses how the Supreme Court further defined its 
role as an _equal branch of government during the mid 1920s. Pusey gives the history 
behind the Judiciary Act of 1925. He explains how Chief Justice Taft made the passage 
of this piece of legislation a primary goal. 12 
H. W. Perry states in his book, Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United 
States Supreme Court, that once the Judiciary Act of 1925 became law, petitioning for a 
writ of certiorari, asking the Court to review the decision of the lower court, became the 
main avenue of reaching the Supreme Court. He then explains the guidelines for issuing 
a writ of certiorari. He describes how the justices used this criteria when the conference 
on which cases to accept. Along with certiorari guidelines, Perry explains the rule of 
four, meaning if four justices find a case "certworthy," the Court grants the writ. 13 
Edward A. Hartnett' s article, "Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-
Five Years after the Judges' Bill," from the Columbia Law Review shows just how 
12Merlo J. Pusey, "The "Judges' Bill" After Haifa Century," Supreme Court Historical Society 
Yearbook (1976): 55-61. 
13 H. W. Perry Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 33-34. 
20 
actively the Justices sought this jurisdictional change. Harnett emphasized the role Taft 
played in passing the Judges' Bill. He cites how Taft put together a committee to write 
the legislation which became the Judges' Bill. Hartnett also mentions Taft's involvement 
with the bill on Capitol Hill. For example, Taft introduced the bill to the House of 
Representatives Judiciary Committee, testified before Congress, as well as corresponded 
with Senator Albert Cummins and other members of Congress. Hartnett clearly shows 
how this bill became law because of the actions of Taft and his associate justices. 14 
Jonathan Sternberg's article, "Deciding Not to Decide: The Judiciary Act of 1925 
and the Discretionary Court," also highlights the actions taken by the Justices to promote 
the change in jurisdiction. Much like Hartnett, Sternberg illustrates how forcefully the 
members of the Court acted. Sternberg also mentions how the switch to discretionary 
jurisdiction gave strength to the Court's silence. In other words, the Court made a 
statement by not taking a certain case. Before discretionary jurisdiction, the Court did 
not have this kind of influence. 15 
The Supreme Court of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries looked and 
acted much differently than the Court of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The 
actions of the Justices created precedents and statutes that further defined the Court's role 
as an equal branch ·of government. Each of the areas mentioned above, circuit riding, 
14Edward A. Hartnett, "Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years after the 
Judges' Bill," Columbia Law Review 100, no. 7 (Nov. 2000): 1643-1738. 
15Jonathan Sternberg, "Deciding Not to Decide: The Judiciary Act of 1925 and the Discretionary 
Court," Journal of Supreme Court History, 33, no. 1 (2008): 1-16. 
opinion writing, judicial review, and the Judges' Bill gave the Court more authority and 
established the federal judiciary as an independent branch of government. 
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CHAPTER III 
CIRCUIT RIDING 
22 
The ratification of the United States Constitution ushered in a new system of 
government. No longer did the thirteen states merely hang together by the threads of a 
confederation, but they now bonded to each other as one nation. Organized chiefly by 
the first three articles of the Constitution, a federal government began to take shape. The 
framers expressly laid out the functions and duties of the first two branches in the first 
two articles - the Legislative and Executive. However, Article III, which organized the 
judiciary, remained short and ambiguous. The founders charged the First Congress with 
the task of organizing the federal judiciary. Even after Congress created the Judiciary, 
questions still plagued the system. The issue of circuit riding offers one example of how 
the members of the Judiciary expanded and further defined its role as a branch of 
government.. 
Background 
In March 1789, the First Congress gathered in New York City. 1 The United 
States Senate took the lead in the creation of a federal judiciary. On April 7, 1789, the 
Senate appointed and assigned a committee the task of establishing the judiciary.2 The 
'Linda Grant De Pauw, Senate Legislative Journal, Documentary History of the First Federal 
Congress, 1789-1791, vol. 1 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), vii. 
2 Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, vol. 
1 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 458. 
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committee consisted often men: Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, William Paterson of 
New Jersey, Caleb Strong of Massachusetts, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, Richard 
Bassett of Delaware, William Few of Georgia, Paine Wingate of New Hampshire, Ralph 
Izard of South Carolina, and Charles Carroll of Maryland. Of these ten, Ellsworth, 
Paterson, and Strong made up the core of the committee.3 
These three senators, Ellsworth, Paterson, and Strong, had compiled the most 
experience of the group. Each had served as a delegate to the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention and as delegates to their respective states' ratification conventions. Out of 
these three, Oliver Ellsworth became the principal author of the bill to organize the 
judiciary. Ellsworth attained leadership because of his strong personality and his ability 
to advocate, which he exhibited in his "Letters of a Landholder."4 
On September 24, 1789, the Senate received word that George Washington had 
signed the "Act to establish the judicial Courts of the United States."5 The Supreme 
Court established under the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not have the same appearance that 
the Court has today. The Judiciary Act of 1789 called for six total justices - one chief 
justice and five associate justices.6 Also, the Judiciary Act of 1789 required the Supreme 
Court to hold two sessions a year in the nation's capitol.7 The first of these sessions shall 
3Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 458-459. 
4 Ibid., 459. 
5De Pauw, Documentary History First Congress, 190. 
6 Judiciary Act of 1789, S. 1, 1st Cong. (1789). 
7 Ibid. 
take place on the first Monday of February, followed by the second held on the first 
Monday of August.8 This same section prescribes the seniority of the justices. The Act 
states that seniority ~hall be "according to the date of their commissions, or when the. 
commissions of two or more of them bear date on the same day, according to their. 
respective ages."9 Lastly, the Judiciary Act of 1789 defined the Supreme Court Court's 
appellate jurisdiction. This gave the Court the authority to "re-examine" cases "and 
[reverse] or [affirm]" a previous ruling. 10 
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Aside from the Supreme Court, the drafters of the Judiciary Act of 1789 created 
the Federal District and Circuit Courts. The Act states that the United Sates "shall be, 
and they hereby are, divided into thirteen districts ... " 11 Each of these districts holds one 
court with one judge. The District Courts must hold four sessions each year. The 
Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the District Courts original jurisdiction in all cases in which 
the District Court has authority, "And the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all 
cases except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury. " 12 
The division of the District Courts into three areas created the Circuit Courts, 
named the Eastern, Middle, and Southern Circuits.13 A Circuit Court then consisted of 
one District judge and two Supreme Court justices. The Judiciary Act of 1789 requires 
8 Judiciary Act of 1789, S. 1, 1st Cong. (1789). 
9Ibid. 
10Ibid. 
11Ibid. 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid. 
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that two sessions of the Circuit Court must take place in each district annually. 14 The 
Circuit Courts have original jurisdiction, much like the District Courts, but, in addition, 
Circuit Courts also have appellate jurisdiction of cases from the District ~ourts. 15 
The Burdens of Riding Circuit 
Not long after the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the requirement of 
circuit riding became burdensome to the Supreme Court. The task of riding circuit 
caused a number of men nominated either to decline their appointments or resign their 
offices. Robert H. Harrison, appointed by George Washington to the first Supreme 
Court, declined the offer from the P~esident. In a letter to Washington, Harrison confided 
that the "duties required by the [1789] Act for establishing the Judicial department, will 
be, from the limited number of Judges, considering the great extent of the States & and 
the frequency of the Courts, extremely difficult and burthensome to perform."16 In 
another letter to President Washington, Harrison claimed the requirements of a "Judge of 
the Supreme Court would be extremely difficult & burthensome, even to a Man of the 
most active comprehensive mind; and vigorous frame." 17 Washington replaced Harrison 
with James Iredell, who quickly became another ardent opponent of circuit duties. 
14Judiciruy Act of 1789, S. 1, 1st Cong. (1789). 
15Ibid. 
16Robert H. Harrison to George Washington, Annapolis, October 27, 1789, in Appointments and 
Proceedings: Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, vol. 1, ed. 
Maeva Marcus and James R. Perry (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1985), 38. 
17Ibid., 36. 
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In March of 1791, John Rutledge, one of the original members of the Supreme 
Court, resigned because his home state of South Carolina offered him the position of 
Chief Justice for the state's highest court. 18 To fill the seat opened by the resignation of 
Rutledge, President Washington appointed Thomas Johnson in July of the same year. 19 
However, Johnson did not accept the President's nomination right away. The issue of 
riding the circuit played a determining role in Johnson's decision to accept. 
After receiving his letter of nomination from the President, Thomas Johnson 
wrote back expressing his reservations. Although honored by his selection by 
Washington, Johnson did not feel as though he could ride the southern circuit. He wrote 
to Washington that if "the southern Circuit would fall to me ... it would at my Time of 
Life and otherwise circumstanced as I am it would be an insurmountable Objection."20 
Johnson had also written Chief Justice John Jay regarding the same matter. Early that 
August, Washington wrote to Johnson telling him that he has spoken with the Chief 
Justice and the Associate Justices and that they "agreed upon that [Johnson] might be 
wholly exempted from performing this tour of duty ... "21 Washington went further to 
say that he hoped the next congressional session would reconsider the requirements of 
riding circuit for the justices of the Supreme Court.22 
18Ibid., John Rutledge to George Washington, Charleston, March 5, 1791, 23. 
19Ibid., George Washington to Thomas Johnson, Philadelphia, July 14, 1791, 72. 
20Ibid., Thomas Johnson to George Washington, Spurriers, Maryland, July 27, 1791, 173. 
21Ibid., George Washington to Thomas Johnson, Philadelphia; August 7, 1791, 76. 
22Ibid., George Washington to Thomas Johnson, Philadelphia, August 7, 1791, 76. 
The United States Senate confirmed the nomination of Thomas Johnson on 
November 7, 1791. He took his seat on the nation's highest bench on August 6, 1792.23 
However, Johnson did not remain on the bench long. On January 16, 1793, Johnson 
wrote to Presiderit Washington to inform him of his decision to resign. He cited the 
duties of circuit riding as the determining factor for his decision. 
The Experience we have had of the little that has been or could be done under 
the present System though excessively fatiguing to the Judges would I thought 
have insured their Discharge from Circuit Duty . . . . I have not Self 
consequence enough to blame others for not thinking as I do as to wish 
Arrangements for my Accomodationl] I ,have measured Things howev~r and 
find the Office and the Man do not fit_ I cannot resolve to spend six Months in 
the Year of the few I may have left from my Family, on roads at Taverns 
chiefly and often in Situations where the most moderate Desires are 
disappointed ... 24 
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Johnson's comments on circuit riding show the stressful nature of the position: time away 
from family, hard travel, and bad conditions. 
The duties .of riding the circuit did not only strike those who left the Supreme 
Court as burdensome, but rather the whole Court held the same opinion. The amount of 
travel required of the justices created many logistical issues. Travel conditions 
sometimes made reaching a quorum on the Court difficult, as it did for the 1792 February 
term of the Supreme Court. William Cushing had trouble reaching the Court because of 
weather, and two other justices, Blair and Johnson, had not yet arrived either. Without 
these Justices in attendance, Justice Wilson had no choice but to adjourn daily. 
23Ibid., Confinnation by Senate, November 7, 1791; Record of Oaths, August 6, 1792, 77, 79. 
24Ibid., Thomas Johnson to George Washington, Frederick, January 16, 1793, 80. 
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The Justices Taking Action 
Among those who remained on the bench, Justice James Iredell became the most 
outspoken critic of circuit duties. Iredell corresponded with his brethren regularly on the 
topic, hoping he could spur the Court into action. In a lengthy letter to a number of his 
colleagues, Iredell stated his beliefs on the issue and argued on behalf of a remedy to ease 
some of the burden. Iredell mentioned two elements linked to riding circuits that he 
found most disagreeable. First, he lamented the conditions justices must work under. 
The arduous travel required by justices on the southern circuit not only threatened the 
justices' health, but also limited their ability to perform their duties as prescribed by law. 
He asked "Can any Man have a probable chance of going that distance twice a year, and 
attending a particular place punctually on particular days?"25 
Iredell also believed circuit riding created problems for the execution of justice. 
If the circuits assigned the justices became permanent, he feared the integrity of the law 
might suffer. He advocated a concept popularized by William Blackstone, an English 
legal forefather, called "prudent jealousy." Prudent jealousy means "that no Man shall be 
a Judge of Assize in the County wherein he was born, or wherein he is resident."26 In 
other words, a person who resides in the region where the judgment shall take place 
cannot retain the impartiality required of a judicial officer. Therefore, Justice Iredell 
25 James Iredell to John Jay, William Cushing, and James Wilson, Philadelphia, February 11, 1791, 
in The Justices on Circuit, 1790-1794: The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 1789-1800, vol. 2, ed. Maeva Marcus (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 132. 
26 James Iredell to John Jay, William Cushing, and James Wilson, Philadelphia, February 11, 1791, 
The Justices on Circuit: Documentary History of the Supreme Court, 133-134, 134n. 
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strongly supported the proposal from Justice John Blair that the justices rotate the circuit 
assignments. 27 
Iredell felt that the proposal of a rotation did not receive adequate attention from 
the members of the Supreme Court. He believed the Chief Justice did not fairly offer the 
question of rotation. Both Iredell and Blair claimed they did not understand that the 
Court had made a decision regarding the rotation of the circuits. Iredell expressed this 
confusion in his letter to Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices Cushing and Wilson, 
while Blair confided his misunderstanding of the situation privately to Iredell.28 Iredell 
also argued the fairness of presenting the question in the absence of Justice Rutledge. 
Iredell believed, if Rutledge had had the chance to vote, no majority would have been 
reached because the Justices would have been split equally.29 
In his response, the Chief Justice began by sympathizing with Iredell and agreeing 
that "The Inconveniences [Iredell mentioned] are doubtless great and unequal ... "30 
Then, Jay argued that only the legislature had the authority to create a remedy for these 
burdens. Justice Cushing, much like Jay, believed the legislature had the authority to 
solve the problems plaguing the Supreme Court. Cushing also argued against Iredell's 
· 
27John Blair to John Jay, New York, August 5, 1790, The Justices on Circuit: Documentary 
History of the Supreme Court, 83-84 .. 
28Ibid., James Iredell to John Jay, William Cushing, and James Wilson, Philadelphia, February 11, 
1791, 133-134; Ibid., John Blair to James Iredell, Williamsburg, July 25, 1791, 196. 
29Ibid., James Iredell to John Jay, William Cushing, and James Wilson, Philadelphia, February 11, 
1791, 132. 
30Ibid., John Jay to James Iredell, Philadelphia, February 12, 1791, 135. 
use of prudent jealousy and countered that such a rotation would only cause 
"inconvenience to citizens by delay of causes ... "31 
30 
Although the more senior justices on the Supreme Court, including Chief Justice 
Jay and the senior Associate Justice Cushing, disapproved of Iredell's proposal of 
rotating the circuits, Iredell did not abandon his plan. Samuel Johnston, Iredell's brother-
in-law, sought to assist in the cause of reducing the stress created by the circuit courts. 
As a member the United States Senate, Johnston introduced a bill written by Iredell, 
which protected a justice from riding the same circuit twice in a row without his consent. 
Essentially, this piece of legislation called for the rotation of the circuits. This bill, the 
Circuit Court Act of 1792, became law on April 13, 1792.32 
The legislative victory of the Circuit Court Act of 1792 allowed the members of 
the Supreme Court to seek some relief from the hardships imposed upon them by the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. However, this taste of liberation only encouraged the Justices to 
request more from the legislature. A record of the collective attitude of the Justices 
toward riding the circuits reached back at least as far as 1790. Collectively, the Justices 
wrote to President Washington expressing their concerns pertaining to the Judiciary Act 
of 1789. However, it is uncertain whether the President received this correspondence. In 
the letter, Jay argued that because the circuit courts remain inferior to the Supreme Court, 
the justices of the latter should not be officers of the former. 33 Two years later, the 
311bid., William Cushing to James Iredell, Philadelphia, February 13, 1791,137-138. 
32Ibid., James Iredell to Thomas Johnson, Philadelphia, March 15, 1792, 248n. 
33Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington, New York, ca. September 13, 1790, The 
Justices on Circuit: Documentary History of the Supreme Court, 89-91. 
Justices again took it upon themselves to create change and wrote to both President 
Washington and the Congress. 
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When the Justices wrote to the President in August of 1792 they laid out their 
feeling bluntly. They protested, "We really, Sir, find the burthens laid upon us so 
excessive that we cannot forbear representing them in strong explicit terms."34 The 
Justices wrote to the President of the United States because they understood the influence 
Washington had among the other branches of government: "Your official connection 
with the Legislature and the consideration that applications from us to them, cannot be 
made in any manner so respectful to Government as through the President ... "35 This 
unified and unprecedented step, taken by a Court normally confined by self restraint, 
shows the fervent disapproval of circuit riding requirements felt by virtually every 
member of the High Court. 
Equally unprecedented, the Justices also wrote a remonstrance to the Congress. 
The phrasing chosen by the Justices sheds even more light on the earnestness with which 
they pled for relief. They began by respectfully chastising Congress for not authorizing 
earlier any alterations of the Judiciary Act of 1789. They scolded the second branch, 
asserting "that the Act then passed was to be considered rather as introducing a temporary 
expedient, than a permanent System, and that it. would be revised as soon as a period of 
34The Justices on Circuit, Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington, Philadelphia, 
August 9, 1792, 288. 
35Ibid., Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington, Philadelphia, August 9, 1792, 288. 
greater leisure should arrive."36 After reminding Congress of the need to modify its 
earlier document, the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Justices proceeded to assist them in 
determining what changes needed to be made. 
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Without reservation, the Justices made their plea against the circuit duties 
prescribed in the 1789 Act. As Justice Iredell had argued earlier to no avail, the Justices 
declared to Congress that the circuits caused too much hardship due to travel conditions 
and impeded the flow of justice. 
That the task of holding twenty seven circuit Courts a year, in the different 
States ... besides two sessions of the Supreme Court at Philadelphia, in the 
two most severe seasons of the year, is a task ... too burthensome .... That the 
distinction made between the Supreme Court and its Judges, and appointing the 
same men finally to correct in once capacity, the errors which they themselves 
may have committed in another, is a distinction unfriendly to impartial 
· • 37 Justice ... 
Consistent with the tone of the first half of the remonstrance, the Justices declined to use 
the contemporary letter etiquette and signed with a demand rather than as "humble and 
obedient servants."38 
The bold action of the Supreme Court proved fruitful during the 1793 
Congressional session. In the Spring of 1793, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1793 
- often overlooked by historians. The Judiciary Act of 1793 attempted to ease the 
burdens of the Justices by reducing the number of circuits each Justice needed to attend 
36Justices of the Supreme Court to the Congress of the United States, Philadelphia, August 9, 
1792, The Justices on Circuit: Documentary History of the Supreme Court, 289. 
37Ibid., Justices of the Supreme Court to the Congress of the United States, Philadelphia, August 9, 
1792,289. , 
38Ibid., Justices of the Supreme Court to the Congress of the United States, Philadelphia, August 9, 
1792, 289. 
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from two to one.39 During the February term of the Supreme Court in 1794, the Justices 
wrote to Congress a second time. In this document, the Justices took the opportunity to 
thank the legislature for affording them some of the relief they sought. Appreciation for 
the congressional act also appears in the private correspondents of the Justices. William 
Cushing wrote to William Paterson, congratulating him on his appointment to the 
Supreme Court and assured him that "An Act, passed this week, eases of near half the 
difficulty. "40 
The Election of 1800 
Issues surrounding the circuit courts remained fairly quiet for close to a decade. 
However, the political climate that followed the election of 1800 thrust the issue back 
into the national spotlight. The Federal Judiciary became caught in the crossfire of the 
political fight between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. The Judiciary became the 
battleground for the greatest fight the young nation had experienced since independence. 
After the election of 1800, John Adams understood what had happened and turned 
to the judiciary to ensure a federalist voice in the federal government. Even before the 
election of 1800, Adams wanted to expand the judiciary. However, the flood of 
Republican victories enhanced the importance of the expansion of the judiciary.41 The 
politically savvy Adams understood that he could block Jeffersonian policy with a 
39Justices of the Supreme Court to the Congress of the United States, Philadelphia, February 18, 
17, The Justices on Circuit: Documentary History of the Supreme Court, 443. 
40Ibid., William Cushing to William Paterson, Philadelphia, March 5, 1793, 345. 
41 Kathryn Turner, "Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801," The William and Mary 
Quarterly, Third Series, vol. 22, no. 1 (January 1965): 19. 
Federalist-stacked judiciary. To reach this end, Adams pressed the lame duck Congress 
to pass the Judiciary Act of 1801. 
34 
Passed by the Senate on February 7, 1801, the Judiciary Act of 1801 became law 
six days later.42 The main elements of the Act included: eliminating circuit duties for 
Supreme Court justices, creating six new circuit courts, and reducing the number of 
Supreme Court justices from six to five. 43 The elimination of circuit duties for Supreme 
Court justices and the creation of new circuit courts gave Adams sixteen new 
appointments. The reduction of the number of justices on the Supreme Court delayed 
any Republican nomination until the retirement of two sitting justices.44 
Strong partisan feelings were associated with this bill from the outset. 
Pennsylvanian Senator, William Bingham pushed for the passage of the Judiciary Act of 
1801, urging that '"the federal Party wish the appointments to be made under the present 
administration ... the Importance of filling these Seats with federal characters, must be 
obvious. "'45 After Congress passed the legislation, Gouverneur Morris wrote "because 
the Federalists 'are about to experience a heavy gale of adverse wind; can they be blamed 
for casting many anchors to hold their ship through the storm?'"46 Aside from the 
partisan actions of the debate, the President appointed and the Senate confirmed John 
42Tumer, "Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801," 20-21. 
43 Richard Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1971), 15. 
44Ibid., 15. 
45Tumer, "Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801," 19. 
46Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis, 15. 
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Marshall as Oliver Ellsworth's replacement as Chief Justice just before the Judicia_ry Act 
passed. Executing the confirmation vote before the judiciary vote allowed Adams to 
keep a six member Supreme Court and put another loyal Federalist on the Court.47 
The defenders_ of Adams claimed that his appointees deserved their po~itions. As 
Adams considered his appointments, he encouraged suggestions of suitable candidates 
for the judgeships. He wrote of the appointment process that it "would cost him 'much 
anxiety and dilligence [sic]"'48 The men who Adams selected had impressive 
qualifications: all had established themselves either as lawyers or as judges. However, 
the appointments did not come without controversy. Each one of the nominations went 
to faithful Federalists. Adams had the reputation of "a strong party man" who "did not 
favor personally or otherwise, the appointment of persons who entertained ~nti-federalist · 
principles. "49 
Opponents of Adams argued against, not only partisanship, but also nepotism. 
Some have argued that relatives received at least four of the appointments. Both Richard 
Bassett of Delaware and William McClung of Kentucky had "importuning relatives." 
The other two had direct relationships with either John Marshall or John Adams. James 
Marshall, the brother of John Marshall, received an appointment for District of Columbia 
47Tumer, "Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801," 19. 
48George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815, 
vol. 2, The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States (New York: 
Macmillian Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), 130. 
49lbid., 129. 
federal court. William Cranch, the nephew of the President, also received an 
appointment for the District of Columbia court. 50 
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Lastly, many believed, especially Republicans, tha~ some appointments violated 
Article I, Section 6 of the United States Constitution. That section forbade Adams from 
filling any of the new circuit court judgeships with sitting members of Congress because 
the courts had been created during their tenure of office. Nevertheless, the President 
found a way around the law. Adams filled the new vacancies by promoting sitting judges 
and then filled their seats with the members of Congress. 
The votes cast during the election of 1800 did not produce a clear winner. 
Therefore, the House of Representatives decided the presidency. The Representatives 
had a choice between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr - John Adams did not receive 
enough votes for consideration. The House of Representatives, still held by Federalists, 
chose Thomas Jefferson. The Federalists preferred Jefferson over Burr because they felt 
Jefferson was more politically moderate. Alexander Hamilton spoke on Jefferson's 
behalf, saying "To my mind a true estimate of Mr. Jefferson's character warrants the 
expectation of a temporizing rather than a violent system."51 Other Federalists saw the 
decision as a choice between the lesser of two evils. John Marshall alleged that "The 
democrats are divided into speculative theorists & absolute terrorists. With the latter I 
am not disposed to class Mr. Jefferson."52 Jefferson defended his own moderation when 
50Ibid., 131. 
51Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis, 26. 
52Ibid., 27. 
he wrote "The greatest good we can do our country is to heal its party divisions & make 
them one people .... both sects are republican, entitled to the confidence of their fellow 
citizen."53 
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The Federalists hoped that Jefferson's moderation would extend to the judiciary 
when Jefferson took the oath of office on March 4, 1801. 54 In the early days of the 
Jefferson administration, it seemed as if Jefferson would keep his promises. Originally, 
~e believed that the judges that had been appointed by his predecessor could not be 
removed. However, he also did not want the Federalists_ to have absolute control of the 
judiciary. To achieve this end, Jefferson ordered that all of the attorneys and marshals be 
removed from office and replaced with Republicans.55 Not until William Marbury, 
Dennis Ramsay, Robert R. Hooe, and William Harper brought suit against the 
government for their commissions did Jefferson favor a total repeal of the Judiciary Act 
of 1801.56 
Jefferson and the Republicans viewed the Supreme Court's decision to hear the 
case brought by Marbury and the others as a direct seizure of power. This fear of 
infringement united the Republicans in a movement to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801. 
Senator Stevens Thomas Mason from Virginia exclaimed that the action by the Supreme 
Court "has excited a very general indignation and will secure the repeal of the Judiciary 
53Ellis, Jeffersonian Crisis, 27. 
54R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2001 ), 148. 
55Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis, 33. 
56Ibid., 43. 
Law of the last session about the propriety of which some of our Republican Friends 
were hesitating." Jefferson also felt the need to express his displeasure when he wrote 
"that the Federalists 'have retired into the Judiciary as a strong-hold ... and from that 
battery all the works of Republicanism are to beaten down and erased.'"57 
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Debate on the repeal act began in January of 1802. While discussing the 
legislation in the Senate, the Republicans expressed their fears of an overly powerful 
judiciary. Again, Virginia Senator Mason argued "that the Supreme Court judges, with 
only ten suits then on their docket, would have little to do to earn their salaries, and that 
for want of employment they might do mischief in areas in which they should not be 
engaged." During the debate, the Senate also discussed whether or not courts could be 
eradicated for the sole reason of eliminating judges. The answer to that question came on 
February 3, 1802 when the Senate passed the repeal bill.58 Just one month later, on 
March 3, 1802 the House of Representatives voted to pass the Repeal Act. 59 
Republicans rejoiced in their victory over the Federalists. The March 5, 1802 
edition of the National Intelligencer stated "Judges created for political purposes, and for 
the worst of purposes under a republican government, for the purpose of opposing the 
national will, from this day cease to exist."60 James Blair wrote to a R~publican ally 
51Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis, 44. 
58Haskins and Johnson, Foundations of Power, 163-164. 
59lbid., 164. 
60Ibid., 164. 
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"congratulating him on 'the happy termination of your labours ... nothing can equal the 
applause and credit you univerally [sic] receive throughout this State by the People."'61 
The cheering of the Republicans, however, did not completely quiet the 
opposition. The Federalists made known their disgust with the Repeal Act. The 
Washington Post declared "that Jefferson had 'gratified_ his malice towards the judges : .. 
and laid the foundation of infinite mischief."' The Washington Post went even further as 
it called for the judges to declare the new act :unconstitutional. 62 Senator Plumer also 
expressed his unhappiness with the bill when he wrote that "The Judiciary that bulwark 
of our rights, is to be placed in a state of dependence; the tenure of the judges office ... is 
to depend upon the whim & caprice of a theoretical President, & his servile minions."63 
Aside from the partisan parts of the Repeal Act, how did it logistically change the 
federal judiciary? The new act restored the judiciary to what it had looked like shortly 
after the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Once again the Supreme Court consisted 
of six members. The Repeal Act also restored the original District Courts and Circuit 
Courts. The restoration of the judiciary created under the 1789 Act furthermore forced 
the Justices to resume riding circuits. 
Lastly, Jefferson delivered one more blow to the Federalists by signing the 
Judiciary Act of 1802. Jefferson feared the decisions scheduled to come from the 
61Haskins and Johnson, Foundations of Power, 164-165. 
62Quoted in The Washington Post, Ibid., 165'. 
63lbid., 166. 
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Supreme Court in its next term. He also realized that the Repeal Act did not take effect 
until July, which meant the Court would have to meet in June. The Judiciary Act of 1802 
immediately restored the Court terms set under the Judiciary Act of 1789, but abolished 
the August term. This meant that the Supreme Court would have to wait until February 
of 1803 to convene. 64 
After the Repeal Act and the Judiciary Act of 1802, it looked as if the system of 
separation of powers might crumble. The Republican administration, due to fears of 
excessive judicial authority, silenced the Supreme Court by abolishing its August term.65 
In tum, members of the judiciary saw this action as a threat to their sovereignty as a 
branch of government. Members of the High Federalist faction, the party's right wing, 
approached the Supreme Court with a plan to negate the Repeal Act. These Federalists 
suggested that members of the Supreme Court refuse to ride the circuits. If the justices 
agreed, the circuit court judges appointed under the Judiciary Act of 1801 would hold the 
court sessions. 66 
The Justices needed to remain united for a plan such as this to succeed. Justice 
Samuel Chase advocated strongly that the Court proceed with the plan presented by the 
High Federalists. Chase adamantly argued against the constitutionality of the Repeal Act. 
In a letter to John Marshall, Chase laid out his reasoning as to why he questioned the 
constitutionality of the Repeal Act. He argued that, when the judges took their positions 
64Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis, 59. 
65Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court, 153. 
66 Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis, 60. 
under the Judiciary Act of 1801, they "immediately thereupon, eoinstante, such Judges 
become constitutional judges; and hold their Offices, and Commissions under the 
Constitution ... "67 
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The decision as how the Supreme Court should act in this regard rested on the 
leadership of John Marshall. Like Chase, Marshall acknowledged that he had "some 
strong constitutional scruples"68 in a letter to Associate Justice William Paterson. He 
expressed his views further in a letter to Justice William Cushing when he wrote "For 
myself I more than doubt the constitutionality of this measure & of performing circuit 
duty without a commission as a circuit Judge."69 Marshall used this correspondence to 
poll his fellow brethren on their thoughts of the situation. In a reply to Marshall, Paterson 
wrote "I think with you, we must abide by the old practice."70 Justice Cushing also sent a 
reply stating "we must"71 hold the circuit court sessions. With a majority of the Court in 
support of riding the circuit, Marshall acted in accord with his colleagues and followed 
the old rule of law. 
The decision to ride the circuit came with its share of consequences. Marshall 
understood that abiding by the Repeal Act would portray the Supreme Court as weak, but 
he also knew he had to pick his battles. Riding the circuit allowed Marshall to avoid a 
67Samuel Chase to John Marshall, Baltimore, April 24, 1802, in Haskins and John~~n, 173. 
68John Marshall to William Paterson, Richmond, April 6, 1802, in Marshall Writings, ed. Charles 
F. Hobson (New York: The Library of America, 2010), 221. 
69Ibid., John Marshall to William Cushing, Alexandria, April 19, 1802, 222. 
70Haskins and Johnson, Foundations of Power, 177. 
71Ibid., 177. 
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direct confrontation with the Republican administration. This could have been damaging 
to the judiciary. Marshall, knowing the cases before the Court, led the judiciary down a 
path that averted confrontation, but also asserted the strength of the judiciary. The Court 
used the case of Stuart v. Laird to achieve Marshall's goal. 72 
The 1803 case of Stuart v. Laird brought an important question before the 
Supreme Court. This case originated as nothing more than a property dispute between 
Hugh Stuart and John Laird. However, Stuart v. Laird also presented a key constitutional 
question. In December of 1801, the newly created Circuit Court in Virginia had ruled in 
favor of Laird, but the decision had to be validated the next term. By the time the next 
term came, Congress had repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801 with the Repeal Act of 1802. 
The Repeal Act made it so once again Supreme Court justices had to ride the circuits, 
which allowed Chief Justice John Marshall to hear the case at the circuit level. 
After Marshall's Circuit Court decision, Hugh Stuart appealed to the Supreme 
Court on a writ of error. He argued the constitutionality of the Repeal Act of 1802 on the 
premise that the Constitution calls for judges to serve for a term of good behavior and 
therefore Congress did not have the authority to abolish formally established inferior 
courts. Due to his participation at the circuit level, Marshall recused himself from the 
case in the Supreme Court, and Justice William Paterson wrote and delivered the opinion 
of the Court. 73 
72Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court, 154-157. 
73Stuart v. Laird, 5 U. S. 299, 308. 
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In his opinion, Justice Paterson authoritatively declared the Supreme Court's 
decision. The Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Repeal Act of 1802. Justice 
Paterson wrote, "Congress has constitutional authority to establish from time to time such 
inferior tribunals as they may think proper; and to transfer a cause from one such tribunal 
to another. In this last particular, there are no words in the constitt.1:tion to prohibit or 
restrain the exercise oflegislative power."74 The Court used a strict constructionist view 
of the Constitution. Justice Paterson sought to end the debate when he concluded his 
opinion with "Of Course, the question is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed."75 
Conclusion 
The debate over riding the circuits gave the Justices the opportunity to assert the 
authority and to further define the role of the federal judiciary. The Justices themselves 
spearheaded the movement to end the practice of circuit riding. They sought refuge not 
only to ease the burdens of travel, but also to ensure the integrity of the judiciary. The 
Justices fought to end circuit requirements because they did not feel it was appropriate to 
correct their own errors. Without guidance from the Constitution, the Justices had to 
determine how to modify their positions. 
The Justices of the Supreme Court further defined their role when asked to decide 
the constitutionality of riding the circuits. At this point in history, the Court had to walk 
a fine line. The tense political climate of the early nineteenth century did not allow for 
74Stuart v. Laird, 5 U. S. 299, 309. 
75 . Ibid., 309. 
any mistakes. Although the Court eventually upheld the constitutionality of riding the 
circuits, it asserted its authority by offering the last word on the subject. 
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CHAPTER IV 
OPINION WRITING 
45 
Each year the President of the United States stands before both houses of 
Congress and delivers the state of the union address. Members of Congress meet with 
their constituents and hold press conferences. The Supreme Court, however, does not 
participate in the world of sound bites. The rhetoric open to other branches of 
government remains closed to the judiciary. Throughout its history, the Supreme Court 
issued its rulings through written opinions. Even though the Court has always used the 
written word to convey its ideas, it has changed its method of delivering the opinions. In 
1800, John Marshall sought to change the Court's opinion writing practices. He directed 
the Court to issue "opinions of the Court" rather than in the traditional seriatim style. 
This move enhanced the Court's authority while diverting other possible problems. 
Between the years 1789 and 1800, the Supreme Court issued its decisions using 
the seriatim model of opinion writing. The young Court inherited the practice from its 
English ancestors. 1 When using seriatim opinions, each justice writes an opinion in each 
case. In theory each opinion holds the same amount of weight. When delivering the 
opinions from the bench, the justice with the least amount of seniority offered his opinion 
first and the rest followed reverse seniority. Therefore, when the early Supreme Court 
rendered a decision, a case had the possibility of having six different opinions. Seriatim 
1George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815, 
vol. 2 of The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States (New 
York: MacMillian Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), 382. 
opinions weakened the authority of the Supreme Court because the body did not speak 
with a unified voice. When he assumed the role of Chief Justice, John Marshall led the 
Court into a new era. 
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Article II, Section 2, gives the President of the Unit~d States the authority to 
nominate judges of the Supreme Court with the consent of the Senate.2 The Federalist 
Party won the first two presidential elections - George Washington in 1789 and John 
Adams in 1796. At the same time, the Federalist Party controlled Congress as well. This 
created a friendly atmosphere for the President. As President, Washington and Adams 
could nominate those whom they felt would best serve their causes. Therefore, th.e 
members of the early Supreme Court all came from essentially the same political 
background. A number of the early justices played pivotal roles in the shaping of the 
federal government. William Paterson, John Rutledge, Jared Ingersoll, William Blount, 
and John Blair all signed the Constitution. Oliver Ellsworth, although not present to sign 
the document, worked tirelessly on behalf of the Constitution as a member of the 
Committee of Detail and then by authoring his Letters of a Landholder. 
The political patronage of the early justices camouflaged the negative aspects of 
delivering the opinions seriatim. Although six men sat on the bench, generally six 
different philosophies did not. During much of the first decade of its existence, the Court 
spoke with a virtually unified voice. The second, third, .and following opinions usually 
echoed the judgment of the first. However, the p.olitical climate of the nation ~oon 
changed. The election of 1800 ushered in a whole new government. The Republicans 
2U. S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. 
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won both the White House and Congress. Jefferson's administration had a different 
philosophy than either Washington's or Adams's. Upon his inauguration, Thomas 
Jefferson had the authority to fill vacancies on the Supreme Court. Much like 
Washington and Adams, he also worked with an agreeable Congress. The issue of 
opinion writing came to the forefront because the Court c_ould no longer rely on a strong 
political alliance. 
John Marshall 
On the frontier of Virginia, John Marshall was born on September 24, 1755/ 
Marshall's upbringing had a soundly positive impact on his life. Although he gre_w up far 
removed from any urban centers, Marshall obtained information from any source 
available. Unlike many frontier families, Marshall's parents, Thomas and Mary, 
supported education. They tried to offer their children, whom John was the eldest, every 
opportunity they could. Thomas Marshall became acquainted with Lord Fairfax, through 
whom he gained access to the land baron's library. This relationship between Lord 
Fairfax and Thomas Marshall provided John Marshall the opportunity to familiarize 
himself with literature and scholarship that would otherwise have been unavailable to 
him. 
While engaging in his studies as a young boy, John Marshall fell in love with 
poetry. Marshall especially embraced the poetry of Alexander Pope. Pope's poetry 
spoke to the young Marshall, specifically his piece titled "Essay on Man." Marshall 
3 Albert Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), 
7. 
grasped the meaning of the poem-the need for, and the astuteness of, order.4 Marshall 
once reminisced to his friend, and colleague, Justi_ce Joseph Story, that he memorized 
many of Pope's moral works and had written in his own hand the words of "Essays on 
Man" by the age oftwelve.5 Marshall's admiration for Pope's poetry foreshadows the 
character Marshall assumed as an adult. 6 
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John Marshall developed his characte~ even further while serving in the 
Continental Army during the Revolutionary War. Throughout ~is life, Marshall enjoyed 
a strong relationship with his father. As a member of the House of Burgesses, Thomas 
Marshall heard, first hand, the passionate speeches delivered by Patrick Henry. On his 
trips home, Thomas relived the experience with his family. As John listened to his father 
he became filled with a patriotic spirit. 7 When the prospect of war became inevitable, 
both Thomas and John Marshall volunteered to fight for a cause for which they both felt 
strongly- liberty.8 
During the winter of 1777-1778 John Marshall found himself with Washington's 
Army at Valley Forge. While at Valley Forge, Washington's Army experienced horrors 
surpassing even that of battle. The soldiers feared the harsh winter conditions much more 
thanthe British troops. Washington chose to camp at Valley Forge because he originally 
. 
4Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, vol. !(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), 45. 
5Ibid., 44-45. 
6Ibid., 45. 
7lbid., 63-67. 
8lbid., 68. 
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believed the area had enough wood forconstruction and fuel and that the surrounding 
farmers would help feed his men. However, those Pennsylvania farmers sold their 
produce to the British rather than to the cold and starving men fighting for their freedom. 
Somehow in the midst of all this misery, Marshall maintained a strong morale. 
As the captain of an artillery unit, Marshall tried to raise the spirits of his men. He 
entertained his men by running and jumping around in his stocking feet, which earned 
him the nickname silver heels because of the cloth his mother used to dam his socks. 
Even though Marshall endeavored to keep himself and his men in good spirits, the dire 
conditions left a lasting impact on the young man. The time he spent at Valley Forge 
implanted in him the importance of a strong central govemment.9 Much like his reaction 
to Alexander Pope's poem "Essay on Man," Marshall yearned for a government that had ', 
the ability and the authority to ensure that nothing like Valley Forge could ever happen 
agam. 
After the Revolution, John Marshall went back home to Virginia, here he put his 
beliefs into practice. Marshall entered Virginia's General Assembly in 1782. His father 
used the reputation he built up while a member of the House of Burgesses in his own 
right to get his son elected. While a member of the General Assembly, Marshall became 
acquainted with many people such as James Madison, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, 
and Edmund RaO:dolph. 10 Marshall once again found himself on the front lines ·with great 
men as his comrades. 
9 Albert J. Beveridge, Frontiersman, Soldier Lawmaker 1755-1788, 146-147; Leonard Baker, John 
Marshall: A Life In Law (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1974), 46. 
10Beveridge, John Marshall vol. 1, 203. 
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After the ratification of the Constitution, Marshall continued his service to his 
home state of Virginia. In 1799, he won a seat in-the United States House of 
Representatives. His tenure in the federal legislature did pot last long. President Adams 
called upon his talents to serve as his Secretary of State. Marshall only held this cabinet 
position for a short time. However, he made a large impact. As Secretary of State, 
Marshall issued the commissions to the controversial appointments made during the 
closing hours of John Adams's administration. One of these commissions, William 
Marbury' s, laid the foundation for another achievement of Marshall. 
In 1800, Oliver Ellsworth resigned his position as the Chief Justice of the United 
States. He had been overseas in France and wrote to President Adams claiming that bad 
health kept him from making the voyage home, and that even ifhe could travel he would 
not be able to resume his duties as Chief Justice. 11 First, President Adams turned to John 
Jay to see if he would once again be the leader of the High Court. Jay declined the 
nomination. He felt that the problems that had caused him to resign earlier had not been 
fully answered and therefore would not be a part of the Court again. 12 The next candidate 
on Adams's list was John Marshall. Marshall gladly consented to the nomination to 
become the fourth Chief Justice of the United States on January 20, 1801. The United 
States Senate quickly confirmed Marshall, 13 and the Supreme Court entered a whole new 
era. 
11Maeva Marcus and James R. Perry, eds., Appointments and Proceedings, vol. 1 of The 
Documentary History of the Sup,:eme Court (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), !23. 
12Documentary History of the Supreme Court Vol. 1, 146-147. 
13Leonard Baker, John Marshall: A Life In Law, 353-355. 
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John Marshall served as Chief Justi~e from 1801-1835. During those thirty four 
years, he and his colleagues made changes to the Court that helped to further define its 
role as the third branch of gover~ent. The choice of John Marshall for Chief Justi~e of 
the United States came about only partly because of his excellence in the law. Marshall 
had also proven himself a strong nationalist and federalist. He had put into prac~ice the 
philosophy he gleaned from Alexander Pope and the lessons learned during the frigid 
. . . 
winter at Valley Forge. The time had come for Marshall to step outside of the shadows 
of his predecessors and place his own stamp on history. 
When Marshall assumed the duties of Chief Justice, he entered a turbulent world. 
Marshall understood that, if the judiciary wanted to retain any authority, it needed to 
change with the times. With a non-federalist in the White House for the first time, the 
Court faced the possibility of becoming more divisive. Marshall displayed his .. 
comprehension of the situation in different ways. First, he designed the decisions in 
Stuart v. Laird and Marbury v. Madison to work in tandem. The Court's decision in each 
of these cases allowed the judiciary to assert its authority without directly confronting 
either of the other two branches of govemment. 14 Just as importantly, Marshall also 
changed the opinion writing practices of the Court. The switch from seriatim opinions to 
opinions of the Court gave Marshall's Court and the judiciary the voice it needed to 
enhance the authority of the federal judiciary. 
14Richard Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic (New York: · 
W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1971), 67. 
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John Marshall began using opinions of the Court at the very onset of his _tenure as 
Chief Justice. 15 Unfortunately, historians have not found any documents expressing why 
he instituted the change. 16 This leaves historians with the task of making their best 
argument based upon information gleaned from other sources. Marshall used th~ new 
style of opinions to leave a lasting mark on the federal judiciary - especially in the areas 
of jurisdiction, national supremacy, and contract law. 
Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, like many of the features of the judiciary, 
remained a source of contention even after the ratification of the Constitution and the 
implementation of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Constitution vaguely outlines the 
Court's jurisdiction. Article III, Section 2, states "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the 
supreme Court shall have originaljurisdiction."17 The language which follows gives the 
Court appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The ambiguity of the Constitution coupled 
with the politics of the period forced the Court to answer these questions. The cases of 
Marbury v . . Madison and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee define the Court's original and 
appellate jurisdiction respectively. 
15Beveridge, Conflict and Construction 1800-1815: The Life of John· Marshall vol. 3 (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919), 16. Marshall used the opinion of the Court in the first decision his 
Court rendered- Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U. S. 1 (1801). 
16Charles F. Hobson, ed., Correspondence, Papers, and Selected Judicial Opinions November 
1800-March 1807, Vol. VI, The Papers of John Marshall (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1990), 70. 
17United States Constitution, Article III, Section 2. 
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Marbury v. Madison (1803)18 dealt with more than just the _issue of judidal 
review. Marshall, in his opinion, declared that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction 
comes only from the United States Constitution and that CoI?,gress does not have the 
authority to change the original jurisdiction. The Chief Justice used this logic to say that 
. . 
the Court did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus on behalf of William 
Marbury. Marbury asked the Court to hear the case under the original jurisdiction given 
to the Court by the Judiciary Act of 1789. 19 However, Marshall stated that the 
Constitution prohibited the Court from taking Marbury's case under the guise of original 
jurisdiction.20 Therefore, he used his opinion of court in Marbury to define the original 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee ( 1816)21 , helped to further define the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court.22 The case began as a land djspute that originated during the time of the 
American Revolution. A citizen of Virginia, Thomas Lord Fairfax, had left Denny 
Martin, an Englishman, a great deal ofland upon his death. In 1793, Martin began to sell 
portions of the inherited land. At that point the State of Virginia stepped in using the 
confiscation acts to question the legality of Martin's ownership of the land. In 1810, the 
18This case will be discussed at length in Chapter V. Marbury v. Madison, 5 V. S. 137. 
19Marbury v. Madison, 5 V. S. 137. 
20Ibid., 180. 
21Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304. 
22R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic (Chapel 
Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1985), 106. 
Virginia court of appeals sided with the State. That decision led to an appeal to the 
Supreme Court on a writ of error.23 
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R. Kent Newmyer, Joseph Story's biographer, believes that this case had an 
influence on _the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction as momentous as lvfarbury v. 
Madison had on its original jurisdiction.24 In this case, the Court had to decide on the 
constitutionality of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Virginia argued against 
section 25 because it believed it to be unconstitutional. However, Justice Story did not 
agree. Story argued that "state courts decisions [ should] be reviewable by the Supreme 
Court if there were to be such a thing as uniform federal law. Anything less would be a 
direct violation of the Constitution itself."25 Justice Story argued against the state 
rightists and challenged them. "'The Constitution of the United States was ordained and 
established,' he declared, 'not by the states in their sovereign capacities, but 
emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution declared, by 'the people of the United 
States.' "'26 Story affirmed the constitutionality of section 25 and thus, the Supreme 
Court's appellate jurisdiction, when he wrote that "the 25 th section of the judiciary act ... 
is supported by the letter and spirit of the constitution."27 
23 R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, 106-107. 
24 Ibid., 106. 
25 Ibid., 108. 
26 Ibid., 109. 
21Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304,351. 
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National Supremacy 
John Marshall's nationalistic ideals compelled him to assert the supremacy of the 
federal law. When the Supreme Court faced questions which pitted state laws against 
federal laws, Marshall sided with the federal law. These decisions strengthened the 
judicial branch of the federal government. In these cases, Marshall assumed the authority 
on behalf of the federal judiciary to define the law of the land. The decisions in 
McCulloch v. Marylancf 8 and Gibbons v. Ogden29 offer two of the most famous 
examples of Marshall asserting national judicial supremacy. 
The 1819 case, McCulloch v. Maryland, dealt with the establishment and the 
taxing of a national bank. The First Bank of the United States lost its charter in 1811. 
Renewing the bank's charter needed the cooperation of the Republicans, who, at first, 
opposed the idea. After the War of 1812, President James Madison understood the need 
for a national bank and asked Congress to establish such an institution. In 1816, the 
Second Bank of the United States received its charter. Maryland, however, wanted to 
limit the power of the new bank. Accordingly, Maryland's State Legislature passed a law 
that imposed a "'tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not 
chartered by the legislature."30 James McCulloch, the cashier at Baltimore branch of the 
Second Bank of the United States, disregarded the tax. For this, the State Legislature 
prosecuted him. McCulloch then appealed to the Supreme Court. 
28McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316. 
29Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1. 
30 McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316. 
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Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the opinion of the court in this case. In his 
opinion, Marshall made two principal points. First, Marshall declared the Bank of the 
United States constitutional, which laid to rest an argument that dated back to the debates 
between Jefferson and Hamilton. Marshall justified this statement by stating that, since 
the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from establishing a bank, Congress 
had the authority to do so under implied powers. Next, Marshall addressed the question 
of whether or not a state could tax a federal entity. Marshall argued that the supremacy 
clause of Article IV took priority over state laws, and, therefore, Maryland did not have 
the right to tax the national bank. 31 
Lastly, the Supreme Court helped shape the identity of the United States 
government in its decision of Gibbons v. Ogden. This case originated when the New 
York Legislature gave Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton control over steamboat 
navigation on all ofNew York's waters as well as other surrounding areas.32 Thomas 
Gibbons challenged the monopoly in state courts under the federal Coasting Act of 1793. 
Gibbons believed that the federal law trumped New York's state law. The case came 
before the Supreme Court in 1824. 
Chief Justice John Marshall also wrote the opinion for the court in this case. In 
his opinion Marshall again asserted that the United States Constitution and federal laws 
are superior to state law. Marshall wrote: 
The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of 
every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, 
31Ibid., 427. 
32 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 1-3. 
connected with "commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, 
or with the Indian tribes." It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line 
of New York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under 
consideration applies ... 33 • 
Marshall made it quite clear that states have to obey and accept the supremacy and 
authority of the United States Congress .. 
Contract Law 
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Lastly, the Marshall Court left its mark on contract law in the United States. The 
cases of Fletcher v. Peck and Dartmouth College v. Woodward show how Marshall and 
his colleagues used their opinions to articulate the national contract law. These issues 
posed important questions for the young nation. An expanding nation ultimately had to 
face many questions concerning landownership and other property rights. Marshall used 
these cases as an opportunity to further the authority of the judiciary. 
The case of Fletcher v. Peck originated in Georgia due to a question of land 
ownership. In 1795, Georgia sold 35 million acres of the Yazoo lands to four different 
companies for a total of 500,000 dollars.34 However, in 1796 the Georgia Legislature 
passed a law that rescinded the previous sale because of unethical actions taken by the 
pervious legislature.35 The purchasers of the land could not sue Georgia because of the 
Eleventh Amendment, which had been ratified due to an earlier case - Chisholm v. 
Georgia. The diversity of citizenship clause, which gives federal courts jurisdiction in 
33Ibid., 197. 
34 C. Peter Magrath, Yazoo: Law and Politics in the New Republic, the Case of Fletcher v. Peck 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1966), 7. 
35 Ibid., I 3. 
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cases between citizens of different states, allowed claimants to bring a case in federal 
Courts. In 1803, Robert Fletcher, of New Hampshire, brought action against John Peck, 
of Massachusetts. The original question before the federal court was whether Peck 
owned the land he sold to Fletcher. 36 
That original question in Fletcher v. Peck asked the federal court allowed Chief 
Justice Marshall to focus the case on the original sale of land from Georgia to the four 
companies in 1795. In his opinion of the court, Marshall explained how the 1795 sale 
was a contract and could not be repealed by the Georgia Legislature of 1796. Marshall 
argued that in 1795, when the sale took place, nothing in the Georgia Constitution 
expressly forbade the sale of the Yazoo lands. He also believed that the Court should not 
interfere in a state matter just because it disagrees with the motives of a legislature. 
Lastly, Marshall explained how the purchasers of the land did not participate in the 
corruption and, therefore, the 1796 repeal law infringed upon their property rights.37 
Marshall showed again how the Constitution, this time using the contract clause, is 
superior to state laws. 
The origins of Dartmouth College v. Woodward date back to before the American 
Revolution. In 1769, Dr. Eleazar Wheelock, of the New Hampshire colony, received a 
grant to create what became Dartmouth College. 38 When the school first began, it had 
Christianizing Native Americans as a goal as well as generally educating all its students. 
36Ibid., 53. 
37Ibid., 74-77. 
38 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 518-520. 
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As a private school, Dartmouth go_verned itself with authority vested in both a college 
president and a board of trustees. The college president had the ability to choose his 
successor. Eleazar Wheelock did so, choosing his son John as his successor. During the 
early nineteenth century, the school faced some difficult administrative issues. This Jed 
the Board of Trustees to seek the termination of the President of the college, John 
Wheelock. 39 
John Wheelock, knowing the prec~ious position of his job, _sought help from the 
New Hampshire State Legislature. In 1816, the New Hampshire State Legislature 
revoked the charter of Dartmouth College and put the institution under the control of the 
State. The old trustees of the college refused to accept the Legislature's decision and 
continued to operate the college as they had in the past. Also, the old trustees brought a 
law suit against William Woodward. Woodward had previously served Dartmouth 
College as its secretary-treasurer. When he left, Woodward took Dartmouth's seal and 
records with him. The state court sided with the action of the State's legislature. After , 
the state court issued its ruling, the old trustees appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court and hired the distinguished orator and statesman, Daniel Webster, to argue their 
case. Webster's argument, which lasted four hours, convinced the Supreme Court to rule 
in favor of the old trustees. The vote was five to one. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court, written by Marshall, follows essential_ly the 
reasoning he enunciated in Fletcher v. Peck. Again, the Supreme Court addressed the 
' ' 
contract clause of the United States Constitution. Near the beginning of his opinion, 
39Ibid., 539-544. 
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Marshall stated that "It can require no argument to prove, that the circumstances of this 
. . . 
case constitute a contract."40 By declaring the school's charter a contract, Marshall 
proposed the basis for his argument. He cited the United States Constitution to show that 
"'no State shall pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts. "'41 Marshall 
applied that quotation from the Co~stitution to show that the New Hampshir_e State 
Legislature did not have the ri~ht to interfere with Dartmouth College's charter and place 
it under the control of the State. The Chief Justice stated in his opinion thusly: "this is a 
contract, the obligation of which cannot be impaired, without violating the constitution of 
the United States ... "42 
Even though Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court, Justice Joseph · · 
Story's concurring opinion deserves equal attention. In his opinion, Story explained the 
difference between a public corporation and a private corporation and how that affects 
the authority of the State. Story used the example of a bank to show the difference. He 
wrote that "a bank created by the government for its own uses, whose stock is exclusively · 
owned by the government, is, in the strictest sense, a public corporation ... But a bank, 
whose stock is owned by private persons, is a private corporation, although it is erected 
by the government. .. "43 Story applied this same reasoning to Dartmouth College, 
therefore declaring it a private corporation. This reasoning also brought Story back to 
40Ibid., 627. 
41 Ibid., 655. 
42Ibid., 650. 
43Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), 17 U.S. 518, 669 (Story, J., concurring). 
Marshall's main argument: that the State did not have the authority to interfere with the 
school's contract. 
Conclusion 
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John Marshall's decision to change the opinion writing practices of the Supreme 
Court brought the Court into a new age. Marshall avoided the problems of a politically 
divided Court by changing the style of opinion writing. If he had allowed seriatim 
opinions to continue, the Court's authority would have remained weak and unreliable. 
The opinions of the Court not only allowed the Court to have a unified voice, but the 
practice also gave Marshall the ability to write many of the opinions himself Throughout 
his thirty four year tenure as Chief Justice, the Court issued over one thousand decisions. . 
Marshall wrote 519 of the decisions himself.44 He did not waste any opportunity to 
have an impact on the nation. Marshall surely left his mark on the Supreme Court and 
the nation as a whole. 
44Paul Johnson, A History of the American People (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), 
237. 
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CHAPTERV 
THE RISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Whether via the bench housed in the dimly lit Old Senate Chamber, or in the 
elegant courtroom enjoyed by the Court today, the Supreme Court has offered the final 
say on constitutional matters. However, during the Nation's formative years the other 
branches often questioned the Court's assertion of judicial review. Historians have 
offered several different versions as to how judicial review became a focal point of the 
Court's authority. Some historians argue that judicial review came as a brilliant response 
to the political culture, 1 while others argue that earlier precedent gave Marshall the ability 
to confirm judicial review,2 and, thirdly, some historians argue that the Supreme Court 
innately had the right of judicial review.3 This chapter argues for a blend of these 
arguments: judicial review became part of the Supreme Court's authority gradually. 
1Richard Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1971), 53-68; R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the 
Supreme Court (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001 ), 154-155. Newmyer also discusses 
some of the earlier precedents for judicial review, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court, 
171. 
2Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, vol. 1 of The Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 
704-705; Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
22-23. 
3George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815, 
vol. 2 of The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States (New 
York: MacMillian Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), 186. 
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. As most earlier historians have argued, the story of the rise of judicial review 
must be set in its historical context. Yet, the starting point of the story remains subject to 
debate by leading scholars. My "gradualism approach" shows that the rise of judicial 
review took place during the Constitutional Convention and durlng its ratification period, 
as well as through early actions taken by the Supreme Court before Marshall. Each of 
these segments of the early national period offers an interesting insight into the 
establishment of judicial review. 
Constitutional Convention 
After the colonists declared their i11:dependence and before the federal 
Constitution had been written, the Articles of Confederation governed the United States. 
The Articles lasted from 1781 to 1787. Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal 
government did not have much power. The majority of the power rested with the 
individual states. For example, the federal government did not have the authority to keep · 
a standing army or to tax the people. The Articles of Confederation also lacked a federal 
judiciary. The Articles state that "The United States in Congress assembled shall also be 
the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter 
may arise between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other 
causes whatever ... "4 By 1786, it became clear that the Articles of Confederation needed 
revision, and so, in that spirit, Alexander Hamilton called for a convention to revise the 
Articles. 
4Articles of Confederation , Article, IX. 
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The convention that had been called by Hamilton took place in the summer of 
1787 in Philadelphia. All of the states sent delegates, except Rhode Island. The original 
goal of the convention was to revise the Articles of Confederation, however, it soon 
became clear that nothing less than turning to the creation of a brand new government 
. . ' ~ 
would suffice. A portion of the debate at what became known as the Constitutional 
Convention centered on the creation of a federal judiciary. The delegates discussed three 
plans for a federal government, each including a federal judiciary. They discussed at 
length the appointment of judges and established the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. 
One of the proposals for the new government, the "Virginia Plan," had been 
developed by James Madison and presented to the convention by Edmund Randolph.5 
Section nine of Madison's proposal called for a federal judiciary. The Virginia Plan 
called for the federal judiciary "to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of 
inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature ... "6 Madison did not mention 
how the judges would be selected, but he did mention that they would serve for a tem1 of 
good behavior, meaning as long as judges acted according to the law they would remain 
in office. Madison also called for a "fixed compensation for [the judges'] services."7 
Lastly, Madison laid out what he believed should be the jurisdiction of the federal 
judiciary. He gave the inferior courts original jurisdiction and reserved the appellate 
jurisdiction for the Supreme Court. Madison then termed the use of such jurisdictions: 
5James Madison, Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1789 ,ed. Adrinne Koch (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1966), 463. 
6Ibid., 32. 
7Ibid., 32. 
all piracies and felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in 
which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may 
be interested, or which respect the collections of the national revenue; 
impeachments ofany National officers, and questions which may involve the 
national peace and harmony.8 
Madison also gave members of the federal judiciary the authority, along with the 
Executive, to inspect acts of the National Legisl_ature.9 
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This section of the Virginia Plan demonstrates th~t the framers of the Constitution 
did not completely neglect the idea of judicial review .. In his proposal, Madison hinted at 
the existence of the legal power of judicial review when he stated that the members of the 
federal judiciary, along with the executive, shall have the right to examine the acts of the 
legislature. Madison's plan called for a system of checks and balances, a system in 
which the federal judiciary would play a significant role. 
William Paterson presented another proposal for a national government called the 
"New Jersey Plan." Like Madison, Paterson, in one section of his plan, he called for the 
creation of a federal judiciary. 10 However, Paterson's New Jersey Plan called for only 
one supreme tribunal. The New Jersey Plan also set forth a manner in which the judges 
were to be selected. Paterson believed that the authority of selecting the judges should 
rest with the Executive. 11 Paterson once again agreed with Madison. Paterson also 
thought the judges should hold their office for a term of good behavior and receive 
8Ibid., 12. 
9Ibid.,32. 
10Ibid., 120. 
11Ibid, 120. 
compensation for their services. 12 Under the New Jersey Plan, the federal judiciary has 
both original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. It had original jurisdiction in cases 
dealing with "all impeachments of federal officers."13 The appellate jurisdiction 
consisted of 
all cases touching the rights of Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an 
enemy, in all cases of piracies and felonies on the high Seas, in all cases in 
which fore.igners may be interested, in the construction of any treaty or treaties, 
or which may arise on any of the Acts for regulation of trade or the collection 
of the federal Revenue ... 14 
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Paterson also stipulated that no member of the judiciary may "be capable of receiving or 
holding any other office or appointment during the time of service, or for thereafter."15 
Lastly, Paterson gave the federal judiciary the authority "for the correction of errors, both 
in law and fact, in rendering judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary of the United 
States."16 
Much like Madison's plan, Paterson's plan also harbors ideas sympathetic to 
judicial review. However, Paterson's statement requires a bit more inference than 
Madison's. Paterson's statement, which conceded to the federal judiciary the authority 
"for the correction of errors, both in law and fact ... ," also suggests the idea of judicial 
review. Clearly both men, Madison and Paterson, ·wanted a judicial check on the 
legislature. 
12Ibid., 120. 
131bid., 120. 
14Ibid., 120. 
151bid., 120. 
16Ibid., 119. 
67 
Alexander Hamilton presented the third proposal for a national government at the 
1787 convention, appropriately called the "Hamilton Plan." Hamilton also called for the 
creation of a federal judiciary in section seven of his plan. Under Hamilton's plan, "The 
supreme judicial authority of the United States to be vested in Judges to hold their office 
during good behaviour with adequate and permanent salaries."17 However, he did not 
provide for the selection the judges. The Hamilton Plan also gave both original and 
appellate jurisdiction to the federal judiciary. Under this plan, the Supreme Court shall 
"have original jurisdiction in all causes of capture ... " 18 Appellate jurisdiction is 
extended "in all causes in which the revenues of the General Government or the citizens 
of foreign nations are concerned."19 Hamilton's plan, like the other two, called for the 
review of acts of Congress, but Hamilton prescribed this check differently than his 
convention colleagues. 
Hamilton gave the check on the legislature solely to the executive. Of the three 
proposals, Hamilton's surely had the strongest central government. Three out of the four 
bodies established under his plan- Senate, Governour or Executive, and the Judiciary-
held terms of good behavior. He also prescribed a review of state laws as to make sure 
state legislatures did not violate the laws stipulated by the federal Constitution. Again, 
this authority rested with the executives of each particular state.20 Although Hamilton did 
171bid., 138-139. 
18lbid., 139. 
19Ibid., 139. 
20Ibid., 139. 
not give the authority to review acts of Congress to the judiciary, he still underst_ood t~e 
necessity of such a power. 
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The debate among the rest of the delegates during the Constitutional Convention 
reveals that those in attendance remained split on the issue of judicial review. Some of 
the delegates came out in favor of the Supreme Court receiving such an authority. 
Governor Morris expressed this opinion when he delivered his statement that "He could 
not agree that the Judiciary ... should be bound to say that a direct violation of the 
Constitution was law ... Encroachments of the popular branch of the _Government ought 
to be guarded agst."21 Others, such as Roger Sherman, disagreed with Morris and 
declared that "This was neither wise nor safe" and that "He disapproved of Judges 
meddling in politics or parties."22 The convention never fully came to an agreement on, 
the issue. When the final draft of the Constitution passed the convention, Article III 
barely gave an outline for the federal judiciary. Those at the convention may not have , 
expressly given the judiciary the right of judicial review, but they did not expressly deny 
it either. 
Ratification 
The delegates may have gone home at the end of the Constitutional Convention, 
but the debate over judicial review continued long after the Philadelphia meeting. After 
the Convention approved the Constitution, it went to the states for ratification. This 
period, 1787-1788, ohime saw the birth of what became a two party political system. 
21Madison, Notes, 463. 
22Ibid., 464. 
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The country broke into two main factions: the Federalists, who supported ratification, and 
the Anti-Federalists, who opposed ratification. Alexander Hamilton left the 1787 
Convention a fervent Federalist. He wanted to promote ratificatio~ to the nat~on and 
therefore, along with James Madison and John Jay, wrote the Federalist Papers. 
These three men, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, authored a total of 85 essays 
promoting the ratification of the Constitution. Federalist 78, written by Hamilton, 
expresses the Federalist attitude toward the judiciary. Hamilton broke the essay into 
three parts. Firstly, he briefly described the method of selecting judges. Secondly he 
defended the term of office given to judges of the United States. Lastly, he commented 
upon judicial authority.23 Both sections two and three offer arguments implicitly 
supporting judicial review. 
While expounding his second point, Hamilton alluded to the power of judicial 
review. Article III, Section One, of the Constitution states that all judges under the 
United States shall hold office for a term of good behaviour.24 Hamilton argued that 
judges deserved such extensive terms because of the role they perform: "In a monarchy, 
0udicial terms of good behaviour] is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince: 
in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the 
representative body."25 He reinforced his position claiming that, to keep the judiciary 
23 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist, Robert A. Ferguson, ed., 
(New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2006), 427-435. 
24United States Constitution, Article III, Section 1. 
25 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist, Robert A. Ferguson, ed., 
(New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2006), 428. 
separate from either the legislative or executiye branches of government, judges needed 
the assurance of this tenure. Allying himself with the famed French legal philo.sopher 
Montesquieu, Hamilton asserted that, if judging does not remain independent, liberty 
cannot exist.26 These words certainly suggest that the judiciary should have a check on 
both the legislature and executive. 
Hamilton emphasized judicial review more clearly in the third part of the essay. 
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He boldly declared that it is the duty of the judiciary "to declare all acts contrary to the 
manif~st tenor of the constitution void."27 After making such a claim, he entered into a 
lengthy discussion on the merits of giving the judiciary this authority. Hamilton insisted 
that the intentions of the Constitution must reign supreme. 
To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; 
that the ~ervant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are 
superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do 
not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.28 
Discrediting the criticism that the authority to declare acts of the legislature void would 
signify the dominance of the judiciary over the legislature, he asserted rather that it would 
preserve the superiority of the people. 29 
During the fight for ratification, Hamilton's voice was not alone on the issue of 
judicial review. A fellow Federalist and Constitutional Convention delegate, Oliver 
Ellsworth, expressed a compatible view on the role of the judiciary in the new republic. 
26Ibid., 429. 
27Ibid., 429. 
28Ibid., 430. 
29Ibid., 430-431. 
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Born April 29, 1745, Ellsworth came from a comfortable family in Windsor Connecticut. 
In 1771, Ellsworth completed his legal studies and was accorded admittance to the 
Connecticut bar.30 He quickly gained prominence in the legal profession. In 1773, he 
began public service as a deputy from Windsor to the Connecticut General Assembly. 
This first step into governmental work sparked a life long profession. By 1786, Ellsworth 
had served as justice of the peace for Hartford, delegate to Continetal Congress, member 
of Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, and a member of the Superior Court of 
Connecticut. This service to Connecticut led to his appointment to the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787.31 
As a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Ellsworth strove for a federal 
government that had a separation of powers. Ellsworth wanted branches of the 
government to act on equal footing so that one could not gain more power than the other. 
The lack of a separation of powers fueled Ellsworth's main objection to the Articles of 
Confederation. Like Hamilton, Madison and Jay, the authors oftheFederalist Papers, 
Ellsworth wrote his own series of essays urging ratification in his home state of 
Connecticut. In his "The Landholder V ," Ellsworth described how a legislature alone 
cannot manage a whole nation. He wrote: "A legislative power, without a judicial and 
executive under their own control, is in the nature of things a nullity."32 Again, in 
30 Maeva Marcus and James R. Perry, eds., Appointments and Proceedings: The Documentary 
History of the Supreme Court, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 115. 
31 Ibid, 117. 
32 Oliver Ellsworth, "Landholder V," in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., Essays on the Constitution of the 
United States, Published During its Discussion by the People 1787-1788 (Brooklyn, NY: Historical 
Printing Club, 1892), 159. 
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"Landholder X," an essay in which Ellsworth vigorously rebuked the positions of Luther 
Martin during the convention, he agreed his colleague only in that he supported a 
judiciary with the authority to "[correct] all errors, both in law and fact."33 
Ellsworth did not limit his contribution to the ratificiation effort to his 
"Landholder" series. He also became a delegate to Connecticut's ratification convention. 
Ellsworth cemented his understanding of judicial review when he rose to speak before the 
convention. He told the Connecticut ratification convention that "If the general 
legislature should at any time overlap their limits, the judicial department is a 
constitutional check. ... if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it 
is void; and the judicial power, the national judges ... will declare it to be so."34 These 
words spoken by Ellsworth seem to parallel those written by Hamilton in Federalist 78: 
By the time the states ratified the Constitution, a true consensus on the question of 
whether or not the Supreme Coun had the authority of judicial review had not been 
reached. However, the lack of a consesus did not stop some from assuming that the 
Court had the authority. Before he even came to the Court, and before the ratification of 
the Constitution, Associate Justice James Iredell understood judicial review to be under 
the purview of a federal judiciary. In 1786, Iredell wrote a public letter explaining his 
position. 
33Ellsworth, "Landholder X," Ford, Essays on the Constitution of the United States, 184. 
34 Merrill Jensen, Ratification of the Constitution by the States De!dware, New Jersey, Georgia, 
and Connecticut: The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, vol. 3 (Madison, WI: 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1978), 553. 
No check upon the public passions, it is in the greatest danger. The majority 
having the rule in their own hands, may take care of themselves; but in what 
condition are the minority, if the power of the other is without limit?35 
Judicial review also found its way into the offical writings of Justice Iredell. 
Iredell, again, referenced judicial review in a charge to the Georgia grand jury 
while acting as a circuit judge. He alleged that the framers had "established [the federal 
judiciary] as a great constitutional guard of the constitution itself ... A restriction upon 
the legislative power, I believe, never existed until the establishment of the American 
governments."36 Just as the framers had in their efforts to secure ratification, Iredell 
turned to the system of checks and balances and characterized the legislature as the 
branch most likely to become tyrannical. 
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Those who did not serve on the Supreme Court also weighed in on the debate. In 
a letter to Alexander Hamilton, William Bradford Jr. wrote that "they [the Supreme 
Court] have the power of paralyzing the measures of the government by declaring a law 
unconstitutional ... "37 This letter, written by a member of the Supreme Court bar, 
undeniably acknowledges that the Supreme Court has the authority of judicial review. 
35Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge's View (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2010), 9. 
36James Iredell's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Georgia, October 
17, 1791, in The Justices on Circuit, 1790-1794: Documentary History of the Supreme Court, vol. 2, ed. 
Maeva Marcus (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1988), 218. 
37William Bradford Jr. to Alexander Hamilton, Philadelphia, July 2, 1795, in Appointments and 
Proceedings: Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, vol. 1, ed. 
Maeva Marcus and James R. Perry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 760. 
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Early Supreme Court Cases 
The Supreme Court took even stronger steps_ toward obtaining the authority of 
judicial review through its own decisions. The Court itself dealt with judicial review 
before Marbury v. Madison, when it heard cases dealing with state laws and their 
constitutionality as well as acts of the federal congress. At least three cases had come 
before the Court before A:farbury: Ware v._ Hylton, Hylton v. United States, and Calder v. 
Bull.38 
In 1796, the case Ware v. Hylton asked the Supreme Court to decide the 
constitutionality of a state law. This case dealt with a Virginia law that had been passed 
in 1777. The law forgave debts owed to British sµbjects. 39 Even though the law existed, 
an instance occurred where a British creditor sued for the collection a debt owed by an 
American citizen that had been due before the American Revolution. Looking to get out 
of his commitment, the debtor sought refuge by trying to invoke the 1777 Virginia law.40-
During the May term of 1793, the Circuit Court for Virginia heard the case of 
Ware v. Hylton; and the court's decision was rendered a month later. Chief Justice Jay 
and Associate Justice Iredell had first heard the case as circuit court judges. Their 
respective opinions show different perspectives on the case. The circuit court did not 
38Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, 704-705; Schwartz, A History of the 
Supreme Court, 22-23. 
39 Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
22. 
40Ibid., 22. 
decide the case unanimously. Justice Iredell and Judge Griffin held one position, while 
Jay stood alone. 
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The opinion delivered by Jay asserted that the Virginia law, passed in 1777, no 
longer remained valid. Jay argued that Article IV of the Treaty of Pairs had restored the 
plaintiffs right to seek payment from the debtor. The decision went on to say that the 
money paid to the State, which the debtor paid in concurrence with the Virginia statute, 
did not substitute payment to the plaintiff after the ratification of the peace treaty. 
Therefore, Jay sided with the plaintiff.41 
The other two judges of the circuit, however, did not agree. Justice Iredell took 
the liberty of explaining his position in a lengthy opinion. He agreed with the plaintiff 
that the debt had not been forfeited, that England had violated the terms of the treaty, and 
that the government had annulled the debt. However, Iredell sided with the defendant on 
the fact that the defendant paid the debt to the State under the authority of Virginia 
statute. Iredell claimed he could not, in good faith, force the defendant to pay the debt 
again. This judgment did not claim that the plaintiff did not have the right to the debt 
owed to him, but only that the plaintiff was "not entitled to it from the present 
Defendant. "42 
After the Circuit Court of Virginia handed down its decision, John Ware filed a 
writ of error. He and his lawyer claimed that the Circuit Court erred in its decision on 
41John Jay, Circuit Court Opinion in Ware, Cases 1796-1797: The Documentary Histo,y·ofthe 
Supreme Court of the United States 1789-1800, vol. 7, ed. Maeva Marcus (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2003), 310. 
42James Iredell, Circuit Court Opinion in Ware, Cases 1796-1797, 292. 
behalf of the defendant, Daniel Hylton. "When by the Law of the Land the said 
Judgment ought to have been given for the said plaintiff against the said defendants,"43 
argued Ware. The Supreme Court heard the case during its 1796 term. 
When it handed down its decision in 1796, the Supreme Court of the United 
States still issued its opinions seriatim. As the seriatim manner prescribed, the justices 
issued their written opinions in reverse seniority. Justice Samuel Chase offered his 
opinion first - it eventually became the most well known opinion in the case. Justice 
Chase believed the pre-constitution Virginia law was unconstitutional. The justification 
for that claim came from Justice Chase when he wrote in his opinion that: 
A treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land if any act of a state Legislature 
can stand in its way .. .It is the declared will of the people of the United States 
that every treaty made, by the authority of the United States, shall be superior 
to the constitution and laws of any individual state; and their will alone is to 
decide.44 
Using the supremacy clause found in Article VI of the Constitution, Justice Chase 
declared the Virginia law void. 
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The other justices who participated in the case, Justices William Cushing, James 
Wilson, and William Paterson, concurred with the judgment of Justice Chase. Justice 
Iredell did not participate in the case due to his involvement in the case at the circuit 
level, and Chief Justice Jay did not participate because he had resigned from his position 
as Chief Justice before the Court heard the case in 1796. Justice Cushing, in his opinion, 
43Ibid., Assignment of Error, June 6-July 10, 1794, 315. 
44Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court, 22. 
argued that the treaty nullified ab inito, from the beginning, all laws of impedime~ts.45 
Justice Paterson, along the same lines, declared that the treaty repealed the Virginia 
statute and voided any payments into the Virginia State Treasury.46 Justice Wilson 
contended that the federal legislature controlled the terms of both war and peace.47 
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Also in 1796, the Supreme Court heard the case of Hylton v. United States; it also 
concerned judicial review. This case differs from Ware v. Hylton in its relation to 
judicial review because it concerns an act of the Congress and not of a state legislature. 
The issue emerged when Congress passed a direct tax with "An Act laying Duties Upon 
Carriages for the Conveyances of Persons."48 The new law took effect in September of 
1794 and placed a duty of one dollar on every two-wheeled carriage and ten dollars on 
each coach. Daniel Hylton, who served as the defendant in Ware v. Hylton, doubted the 
constitutionality of such a law. Therefore, after the law took effect, he refused to pay the 
tax.49 This act of civil disobedience set the stage for the Supreme Court to weigh in on 
the question of constitutionality of a federal act of Congress. 
The case came before the Circuit Court of Virginia in 1795, and Hylton's lawyer 
made the argument that Congress went beyond its constitutional authority by creating the 
carriage tax. The defense argued that the carriage tax was a direct tax and the 
45Julius Goebel Jr., Antecedents and Beginnings, 753; Hylto_n v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 184 
(Cushing, J.). 
46Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171. 
47Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 753. 
48lbid., 778. 
49lbid., 778-779 .. 
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Constitution required that all direct taxes "shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included wit~in this Union, according to their respective Numbers ... "50 
Nevertheless, the judges of the Circuit Court of Virginia rejected their argument and 
found in favor of the plaintiff, the United States.51 However, the judgment of the Circuit 
Court did not bar the defendant from seeking a writ of error. 
In June of 1795, Hylton secured the writ of error. The writ ordered the Supreme 
Court to hear the case and correct any errors found in the judgment of the Circuit Court. 
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in March of 1796. The new Chief Justice, 
Oliver Ellsworth, did not participate in the decision because of he had been absent during 
oral argument. Associate Justice William Cushing, also absent during oral argument, 
refused to participate in the decision. Justice Wilson abstained from voting due to his 
participation in the case at the circuit level. 
As in Ware v. Hylton, the Supreme Court issued opinions seriatim. Justices 
Chase, Paterson, and Iredell each delivered an opinion. The participating justices voted · 
unanimously to uphold the ruling of the Circuit Court and therefore the constitutionality 
of the statute in question. Each of the justices, beginning with Chase, declared that the 
carriage tax did not fall under the definition of a direct tax. Justice Paterson stated that, 
since carriages fall under consumption, a tax on carriages must be indirect. Justice Iredell 
agreed with Paterson, but justified the carriage tax as indirect on the basis that it cannot 
50U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2. 
51Judgment of the Circuit Court, Cases 1796-1797, 436. 
be apportioned. 52 These opinions offer the first utterances of the Court deciding the 
constitutionality of an act by the federal congress. 
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In 1798, The Supreme Court heard a third case that presented a constitutional 
question. The case of Calder v. Bull came to the Supreme Court out of the state of 
Connecticut. This case originated as _a dispute over a will. The Connectic1:1t legislature 
disregarded a ruling from the probate court, which declined to record the will in question. 
The petitioner, John Calder, filed suit because he felt the state legislature violated the 
United States Constitution's prohibition on ex post facto laws. 53 Each level of the 
Connecticut judicial system ruled in favor of the state legislature. The case reached the 
Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of error from the Connecticut State Court of 
Errors. 54 
Again, the Supreme Court issued its ruling seriatim. Although the decision was 
unanimous, Justices Chase, Paterson, Iredell, and Cushing each wTote separate opinions 
in the case. Justice Chase justified his opinion that the Connecticut State legislature did 
not violate the Constitution by asserting that the ex post facto clause only refers to 
criminal law. Justice Paterson agreed with Chase and added that he believed that to be 
the intent of the framers. Justices Iredell and Cushing came to the same conclusion, but 
offered different reasoning. Justice Iredell argued that the act passed by the Connecticut 
legislature was judicial rather than legislative, therefore not under the ex post facto 
52William Tilghman's Notes on the Justices' Opinions, Cases 1796-1797, 500. 
53U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9. 
54Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings, 782. 
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regulation. Justice Cushing agreed wit~ Iredell. 55 Here, again, the justices evaluated the 
constitutionality of a law. 
The explicit establishment of judicial review came as another_product of the 
Marshall Court, the famous decision of Marbury v. Afadison (1803).56 The case 
materialized due to the tumultuous transfer of power, from the Federalists to the 
Republicans, after Thomas Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801. President Adams 
singed and a Federalist Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801 during the latter days 
of Adams' administration. The passage of this act allowed Adams to nominate sixteen 
new judges. 57 These judges became known as the "Midnight Judges." 
The nomination of William Marbury as the justice of the peace for the District of 
Columbia occurred during the time of the Midnight Judges. However, the Secretary of 
State did not issue Marbury his commission. After Thomas Jefferson took over the 
Presidency, he ordered his new Secretary of State, James Madison, to ignore the 
commission.58 Marbury still felt entitled to the commission, the change in administration• 
notwithstanding. Looking for a solution to his problem, Marbury turned to the Supreme 
Court. He filed for the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus - an order from the 
Court to an official to do a specific task that is required by law.59 
55Ibid., 783-784. 
56William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Revised and Updated (New York: Vintage Books, 
2001), 27. 
57Richard Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1971),15. 
58William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Revised and Updated (New York: Vintage Books, 
2001), 27. 
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The Supreme Court began hearing lvfarbury v. Mad_ison in December of 1801.60 
However, it did not get to finish its adjudication of the case until February of 1803.61 The 
handing down of this opinion did more than just resolve this case; it also created a new 
doctrine. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the famous opinion for the court, and all of 
his colleagues concurred with the opinion. While writing this opinion, Marshall 
answered more than just the question of whether William Marbury was entitled to his 
commission. It also defined the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and provided, in effect, a 
declaration of independence for the nation's highest Court. 
Chief Justice John Marshall broke his opinion of the Court in Marbury v. Madison 
into four different questions. First Marshall asked if Marbury had a legal right to the 
position of justice of the peace for the District of Columbia, and to the commission. 62 
Marshall answered that Marbury did have a legal right to the position. Marshall found 
that an appointment became valid after the President signs the commission of the office.63 
So, at this point in Marshall's opinion, Marbury appeared to have a right to his 
commission from President Adams. 
59Kermit Hall, The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States 2nd edition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 603-604. 
60Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis, 43. 
61The court proceedings were interrupt~d because of debate over the Judiciaty Act of 180 I. 
President Jefferson and his Republican congress feared political impact of.the new system that had been 
hastily passed through at the end of President Adams' term, so they repealed the Judiciaty Act of 1801 and 
passed the Judiciary Act of 1802, which reinstated the old judicial system, but also delayed the meeting of 
the Supreme Court from December of 1801 to February 1803. For further reading look at William H. 
Rehnquist, The Supreme Court, or George Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John 
Marshall 1801-1815. 
62Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 154 (1803). 
63Ibid., 155. 
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Next Marshall raised the question of whether the law gave Marbury a remedy.64 
Again, Marshall answered the question affirmatively. He wrote in his opinion that "The 
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and 
not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no 
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." 65 This means that there should legally 
be a way for Marbury to receive his commission. 
The third question of Marshall's opinion asked if a writ of mandamus was the 
proper remedy in this case.66 Once more, Marshal answered the question positively. He 
looked back and applied an old English case where a writ of mandamus had been used to 
direct an English official to perform a certain task. 67 Jefferson and the Republicans 
feared the answer to this question because they worried that Marshall might assume more 
authority and begin to direct other branches of government. Marshall, however, feared 
that outcome as well and, thus, tried to steer the Court from taking cases that were 
political in nature. 
The fourth, and final, question present in Marshall's opinion asked if the Supreme 
Court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus in this case. 68 It is in this section of 
Marshall's opinion that judicial review was clearly enunciated. Even though Marshall 
believed that Marbury had a right to his commission, and that a writ of mandamus could 
64Ibid., 154. 
65Ibid., 163. 
66lbid., 154. 
67Ibid., 163. 
68lbid., 154. 
be used to secure the commission, he believed that the Supre~e Court did not have the 
authority to issue such a writ in this case. Marshall came to this conclusion because of 
the jurisdictional boundaries specified by Article III of the Constitution. 
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Article III of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court both original 
jurisdiction,69 a court allowed to hear a case in the first instance, and appellate 
jurisdiction,70 a court with the authority to review decisions from lower courts. When 
Marbury first brought his case to the Supreme Court, he filed the case_under the Court's 
original jurisdiction. This procedure was correct under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789. That section gave the Supreme Court the authority "to issue writs of Mandamus in 
cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons 
holding office, under the authority of the United States."71 It appeared on first reading 
that Marbury had the right to file his case with the Supreme Court via original 
jurisdiction case because the Secretary of State, James Madison, was a "person holding 
office" that was "under the authority of the United States."72 However, Marshall felt that 
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 violated the jurisdiction that had been laid out by 
the Constitution. He believed that the Constitution should take priority and Article III of 
the Constitution states that "the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases 
690riginal Jurisdiction: The jurisdiction granted a court to try a case in the first instance, make 
findings of fact, and render a usually appealable decision. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, s. v. 
"Original Jurisdiction." 
70 Appellate Jurisdiction: The jurisdiction granted to particular courts to hear appeals of the 
decisions of lower tribunals and to reverse, affinn, or modify those decisions. Merriam-Webster's 
Dictionary of Law, s. v. "Appellate Jurisdiction." 
71Judiciary Act of 1789, S. 1, 1st Ccmg. (1789). 
72Rehnquist, The Supreme Court, 30-31. 
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affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state 
shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction."73 
Therefore, Congress did not have the authority to statutorily change, including adding t~, 
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. In his opinion for the court, Marshall declared 
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional. Marbury may never have 
received his commission as a result of this case, but Marshall established judicial review 
for the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Conclusion 
Thus, Marbury v. Madison is unquestionably the final elocution of the power of 
judicial review; however, its antecedents cannot be ignored. As we have seen, clear 
evidence exists that shows the origins of judicial review existed as early as the 
Constitutional Convention. The idea lingered in uncertainty throughout the first decade 
of the Court's history. With its decision in Marbury, the Supreme Court fully embraced 
judicial review and, as a consequence the Court assumed its place as an equal branch of 
government. 
73Ibid., 31. 
EPILOGUE 
THE JUDGES' BlLL 
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In 1925, almost one hundred years after the death of the great Chief Justice John 
Marshall, the Supreme Court completed its fabrication _of the identity the early Court 
strived for with the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925. In 1921, William Howard Taft 
became the Chief Justice of the United States. Taft admired John Marshall and his 
accomplishments. He once said that "[John Marshall] made this country ... Marshall is 
certainly the greatest jurist America has ever produced, and Hamilton our greatest 
constructive statesman."1 Taft prioritized judicial reform, which he tried to do as 
president, but failed.2 With the goal of judicial reform in mind, Taft began to draft the 
Judiciary Act of 1925. This became known as the Judges' Bill. 
. •, 
Taft hoped to strengthen and reform the federal judiciary by redefining the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. Throughout the history of the 
Court, cases have reached the supreme bench using different avenues. Currently, counsel 
petition for a writ of certiorari,3 asking the Court to call up the records of a lower court to 
review its decision, to present their case to the Supreme Court, however, this is only a 
1Archie Butt to Clara, Washington, D.C., February 27, 1910, in Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate 
Letters of Archie Butt Military Aide, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1930), 293-
294; Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 
259-260. 
2Merlo J. Pusey, "The "Judges' Bill" After Haifa Century," Supreme Court Histotical Society 
Yearbook (1976): 55. 
3Certiorari: An extraordinary writ used by a superior court to call up the records of a particular 
case from an inferior judicial body. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, s. v. "Certiorari." 
recent pathway to the Court. For over a century, a mandatory jurisdiction of a writ of 
error plagued the Court. The Judiciary Act of 1789 established and defined the writ of 
error for the Supreme <;ourt. 
Writ of Error 
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 outlines the Supreme Court's appellate 
jurisdiction. This part of the legislation states that contested issues under the control of 
the federal government such as treaties, statues, or commissions, may come before the 
Supreme Court through a writ of error.4 This section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
established a mandatory jurisdiction. It took over a century to realize the hardships of 
such a jurisdiction and the positive impact its removal could have on the Court's 
authority. 
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The case Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge Proprietors came 
to the Supreme Court through a writ of error in 1837. By this time, Roger Brooke Taney, 
a loyal Jacksonian Democrat, had replaced John Marshall as Chief Justice of the United 
States. The Supreme Court was no longer being led by an ardent Federalist. This change 
in leadership not only affected the outcome of the case, but it also left only Joseph Story 
to take up Marshall's voice. 
The origins of the case date back to 1785, when the Massachusetts Legislature 
granted some Charlestown businessmen a charter to build a bridge over the Charles River 
and, thus, effectively replace the old ferry. In return, the proprietors received a forty-year 
4Judiciary Act of 1789, S. 1, 1st Cong. (1789). 
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guarantee of tolls. 5 After the State saw how much the bridge enhanced travel, it extended 
the guarantee another thirty years, which meant the proprietors of.the Charles River 
Bridge could receive tolls for a total of seventy years. However, in 1828 the 
Massachusetts Legislature granted the Warren Bridge Corporation a charter to build 
another bridge over the Charles River. The proprietors of this second bridge had the right 
to collect the same amount in toll, but only for six years. After the sixth year, the State 
turned the bridge into a free passageway.6 
In 1830, the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge went to the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts -hoping to get an injunction against the Warren Bridge. However, the 
state's Supreme Judicial Court did not grant the injunction "because of the proprietors' 
ambiguous claims to exclusive rights."7 Following the decision from the high court of 
Massachusetts, the plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court first began hearing the oral argument for the case in 1831, 
while Chief Justice Marshall still presided over the Court. Originally, the Court had been 
divided on this case and, therefore, did not issue a ruling. The Supreme Court heard 
another argument after Chief Justice Taney had been confirmed and issued its ruling in 
1837.8 The opinions in this case show a stark difference between Roger Taney and 
Joseph Story. Taney wrote the opinion of the Court and Story wrote a strong dissent. 
5 Stanley I. Kutler, Privilege and Creative Destruction: The Charles River Bridge Case (New 
York: The Norton Library W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1971), 1. 
6Kutler, Privilege and Creative Destruction, 2. 
7 Ibid., 3. 
8lbid., 3. 
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In his book, Privilege and Creative Destruction: The Charles River Bridge Case, 
Stanley Kutler illustrates how Chief Justice Taney "reduced the plaintiff's argument to 
two basic propositions."9 The first of these propositions held that the plaintiff believed 
that the rights from the 1650 ferry grant to Harvard shifted to the Charles River Bridge. 
Taney disagreed with this claim and declared that "Whatever exclusive privileges 
attached to the ferry followed the fate of the ferry." 10 Taney argued that if the rights had 
belonged to the ferry and the ferry no longer existed - neither did the rights. 
The second proposition Taney saw, in the plaintiff's argument held that the actions 
of the Massachusetts Legislature in 1785 and 1792 '"necessary implied"' the exclusive 
rights of the Charles River Bridge. Again, Taney disagreed with the argument. He did 
not believe that anything could be proven by implication. He argued that the plaintiffs ,, 
"must show that the State had entered into a contract with them ... not to establish a free 
bridge .... Such, and such only, are the principles upon which the plaintiffs ... can claim 
relief." 11 Due to these arguments, the Court ruled in favor of the Warren Bridge 
Proprietors. 
The decision by the Court infuriated Justice Story, who fought to get a decision 
for this case in 1831. He exclaimed that he felt "humiliated, as [he thought] everyone 
[there was], by the Act which ha[d] now been confirmed." 12 Story's heated dissent went 
9Ibid., 87. 
10 Ibid., 87. 
11Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge Proprietors, 36 U.S. 420,540. 
12Kutler, Privilege and Creative Destruction, 95-96. 
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directly to the argument made by Taney. The chief disagreement rested in how to 
interpret charters. Taney believed they should be interpreted conservatively, and Story 
argued they should be interpreted liberally. Story believed that "If the courts and judges 
were not at liberty to presume and imply meanings of charters, there would be, he said, 
an end to the case."13 
Justice Story also looked back to precedents in his dissenting opinion. In 
particular, Story cited the 1810 case of Fletcher v. Peck. In this case, M~rshall declared 
that a legislature cannot rescind its own grant. Story believed that the action of the State 
legislature to create the Warren Bridge essentially nullified the charter of the Charles 
River Bridge. 14 In other words, Story alleged that the State of Massachusetts rescinded 
its own grant and therefore the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge had a right to the . 
injunction. 
This case ended with three different opinions: Chief Justice Taney's opinion of 
the Court, Justice Story's dissenting opinion, and Justice John McLean's concurring 
opinion. The three types of opinions suggests that the Justices did not all agree. No 
justice joined Taney on his opinion of the Court. Justice Henry Baldwin joined Story's 
dissent. The majority of the Court, Justices Philip Barbour, Smith Thompson, and James 
Wayne, joined Justice McLean's concurring opinion, which stated that the Court did not 
13Ibid., 97. 
14Ibid., 99. 
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have jurisdiction in the case. 15 This type of vote begs the questions of whether or not the 
Justices would have granted certiorari had the Court any discretionary jurisdiction. 
The Judges' Bill 
. As the nation matured the docket of the Supreme Cqurt began to grow. States' 
rights cases as well as industrialization led to an increase of cases on the Court's docket. 
The Judiciary Act of 1891 and the creation_ofthe Courts of Appeals helped to bear some 
of the burden. The 1891 Act created nine new federal appellate courts. These courts 
assumed the appellate jurisdiction of the original Circuit Courts. Along with the creation 
of the new appellate courts, Congress abolished the circuit riding requirement for the 
Justices of the Supreme Court. 16 
The Judiciary Act of 1891 also granted the Court some discretionary jurisdiction,, 
but did not relieve the Court of much of its mandatory jurisdiction.17 Under the Judiciary 
Act of 1891, the Supreme Court could decide to review decisions of the Courts of 
Appeal. However, cases from the highest state courts maintained their right to appeal to 
the Supreme Court. The Judiciary Act of 1891 signaled the beginning of a transition 
from a Supreme Court with mandatory jurisdiction to a Court with discretionary 
jurisdiction. 18 
15Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge Proprietors, 36 U.S. 420,583 (McLean, 
J., Concurring). · 
16Kermit Hall, The Oxford Companion To The Supreme Court of the United States (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 548-549. "Judiciary Act of 1891" 
17Jonathan Sternberg, "Deciding Not to Decide: The Judiciary Act of 1925," Journal of Supreme 
Court History, 33, no. 1(2008): 5. 
18Hall, The Oxford Companion To The Supreme Court of the United States, 548. 
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Before 1925, many cases had a right to appeal to the Supreme Court, especially 
cases dealing the constitutionality of statute or cases where capital sentences occurred. 19 
These cases were appealed to the Supreme Court through a writ of error - as was the case 
in Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge Proprietors. In a writ of error, 
the Court was "limited ... to reviewing ... questions of law in the appeals brought before it, 
rather than questions offact."20 The Judiciary Act of 1925, the Judges' Bill, changed the 
protocol for appealing to the Supreme Court. 
In October of 1921, Chief Justice Taft assembled a committee of justices to work 
on a draft of the Judges' Bill.21 The committee consisted of Justices Willis Van 
Devanter, William Day, James McReynolds, and George Sutherland.22 Through this 
piece of legislation, the Justices hoped to clear the Supreme Court's docket of cases that •· 
they did not feel had constitutional importance. Chief Justice Taft wrote to Senator 
Augustus Stanley of Kentucky, speaking of the Judiciary Act of 1925, "the truth is that 
there is no other way by which the docket in our Court can be reduced so that we can 
manage it. We are now a year and three months behind."23 To achieve this goal, the "bill 
19
stemberg, "Deciding Not to Decide," 5. · 
20Ibid., 4. 
21 Ibid., 9. 
22Pusey, "The "Judges' Bill" After Haifa Century," 56. 
23Ibid., 57. 
propos[ed] to enlarge the field in which certiorari is to take the place of obligatory 
jurisdiction. "24 
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Taft and the committee of justices worked tirelessly for the passage of the Judges' 
Bill. Taft went so far as to personally introduce the bill for the first time to the House 
Judiciary Committee in 1922.25 Justices lobbying for congressional support became a 
fairly regular occurrence. Chief Justice Taft, along with associate Justices Van Devanter, 
McReynolds, and Sutherland, had the most interaction with Congress.26 This type of 
interaction between justices and members of congress is normally a rare occurrence, 
which further stresses the importance the Justices placed on this piece of legislation. 
Once the Judiciary Act of 1925 became law, petitioning for a writ of certiorari 
became the main avenue of reaching the Supreme Court. Even though certiorari is a form 
of discretionary jurisdiction, there are guidelines that help the Court decide if a case is 
certworthy. The guidelines can be found in Rule 10 and H.W. Perry Jr. lays out Rule 10 
in his book Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court. The 
guidelines consist of: 
(a) When a United States court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with 
the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same matter; or has 
decided a federal question in a way in conflict with a state court of last resort; or 
has so far departed from the accepted an:d usual course of judicial proceedings, or 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this 
Court's power of supervision. 
24Ibid., 56. 
25Stemberg, "Deciding Not to Decide," 9. 
26Ibid., 12. 
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(b) When a state court of last resort has decided a federal question in a way in 
conflict with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States 
court of appeals. . 
(c) When a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an 
important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
this Court, or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with applicable 
decision of this Court ... 27 
The Justices vote on whether or not to grant certiorari, and if four justices want to hear a 
case certiorari is granted. This is known as the rule of four.28 At this point, the United 
States Supreme Court became a court primarily of dis~retionary jurisdiction. 
The Impact on the Court 
The Judiciary Act of 1925 helped to define and strengthen the Supreme Court as 
an equal branch of government. Once certiorari became the main avenue for cases to 
reach the Supreme Court, the Justices gained the authority to declare which cases had 
constitutional importance. The 1960s case of Gideon v. Wainwright shows how certiorari 
gave the Justices this new authority. This case focused on the Sixth Amendment right to·•. 
an attorney in a jury trial. The Sixth Amendment states that "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right. .. to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."29 
In 1942, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Betts v. Brady. Betts v. 
Brady had set the precedent on issue of an accused person's right to an attorney. Betts, a 
Maryland man, faced charges of robbery. At the time of arraignment, Betts informed the 
27H.W. Perry Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 33-34. 
28William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Revised and Updated (New York: Vintage Books, 
2001), 12. 
29U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI. 
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judge of his financial situation. He asked the court to appoint an attorney to represent 
him because he could not afford one.30 The judge denied Betts's request stating that ~he 
co~rts of Carroll County Maryland only supplied counsel in cases of murder or rape.31 
Upon appeal, Judge Carroll T. Bond upheld the decision to deny a state sponsored 
attorney because Betts "was a man forty-three years old, of ordinary intelligence and 
ability to take care of his own interests on the trail of that narrow issue."32 Justice Owen 
Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court for the six to three majority. 
Justice Roberts argued that the Maryland Courts did not violate Betts's Sixth 
Amendment right or the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He declared 
that the "Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution applies only to trials in federal 
courts."33 The opinion went further to say that the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
extend the rights of the first ten, specifically for this case the Sixth, to the states except in 
"certain circumstances."34 Roberts stipulated that the question of state sponsored 
representation shall be left to the individual state legislatures. He did not want the 
Court's opinion to "straightjacket"35 the states. 
Three justices dissented from the Betts majority - Justices Hugo Black, William 
0. Douglas, and Frank Murphy. Justice Black wrote the dissenting opinion and the 
30Betts v. Brady 316 U. S. 455, 457. 
31Ibid., 457. 
32Ibid., 472. 
· 
33lbid., 461. 
34Ibid., 461-462. 
35Ibid., 472. 
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others concurred. Black countered Justice Roberts's assertion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not extend the Sixth Amendment rights to state courts. He pointed out 
that if this case had come before the Supreme Court from a federal bench, the Court 
would have had to reverse the lower court's decision rather than affirm.36 He also 
showed how precedents from both state and federal courts have extended Sixth 
Amendment rights regardless of intelligence or financial standing.37 
In 1953, the Supreme Court entered a new phase as the governor of California, 
Earl Warren, became the Chief Justice of the United States. Before his years on the 
Court, Earl Warren worked to secure the right to counsel in California as Governor and 
Attorney General. After becoming Chief Justice, Warren sought to revisit the issue of 
Betts v. Brady and the Sixth Amendment.38 In 1962, the Supreme Court received a 
petition for a writ of certiorari on behalf of Clarence Gideon. Gideon faced similar 
charges as Betts and was also denied counsel. Warren urged his colleagues to grant 
Clarence Gideon's petition for certiorari. In 1963, the Supreme Court heard oral 
argument and once again faced the constitutional question posed in Betts v. Brady. 
Much like Betts, Gideon faced minor felony charges of breaking and entering a 
poolroom in a Florida State court.39 Gideon also requested the appointment of counsel 
due to his financial situation. The judge denied his request, stating that Florida law only 
36Betts v. Brady 316 U.S. 455, 474-475 (Black, J. dissenting). 
31Betts v. Brady 316 U. S. 455, 475-477 (Black, J. dissenting). 
38Jack Harrison Pollack, Earl Warren: The Judge Who Changed America (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979), 217. 
39Gideon v. Wainw;ight 372 U.S. 335, 336. 
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allows for state appointed counsel when facing capital charges.40 Just as Betts, Gideon 
represented himself during the trial and did the best he could. However, the jury found 
him guilty and sentenced him to five years in prison .. Gideon sought redress from the 
Florida State Supreme by asking for a writ of habeas corpus. Florida's State Supreme 
Court denied the remedy.41 This time, however, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
petitioner - Clarence Gideon. 
Justice Black wrote for the unanimous Court. Much of Black's dissenting opinion 
in Betts v. Brady now became law. When the Court agreed to hear oral argument, it 
required the counsel, on both sides, to argue the merits of the Court's decision in Betts v. 
Brady.42 The prevailing argument called for the reversal of the Betts decision. Black 
then declared that the Sixth Amendment must be applied to the states to protect the Due 
Process present in the Fourteenth Amendment. He went further to state that the Court got 
it wrong when it decided Betts. As he stated in his 1942 dissent, the Court ignored earlier 
precedent.43 Black ended his opinion with the statement "Twenty-two States, as friends 
of the Court, argue that Betts was 'an anachronism when handed down,' and that it 
should now be overruled. We agree."44 
40Ibid., 337. 
41Ibid., 337. 
42lbid., 338. 
43Ibid., 341-343. 
44Ibid., 34.5. 
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The significance of Gideon is not that it overturned a previous precedent, but that 
the Justices decided that the case had constitutional importance and had the final say ·on 
the constitutional issue. In Gideon, the Justices decided a constitutional question existed. 
In its decision, the Court went from being divided on the issue of Sixth Amendment 
rights to speaking with a unanimous voice. When reflecting on the decision, Earl Warren 
said "It interpreted the Constitution to say exactly what it said."45 Not until after the 
Judiciary Act of 1925, did the Justices have the right or the authority to decide if a case 
had constitutional importance or have the final say on constitutional questions. 
Conclusion 
The year 1925 marked another pivotal moment in the history of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Once again it took matters into its own hands and explored 
new ways of enhancing its authority on constitutional matters. The Court, under Chief 
Justice William Howard Taft, achieved the identity sought by those of the early national 
period. Under John Marshall, the Court assumed the authority to answer constitutional 
questions with its decision in Marbury v. Madison. The passage of the Judiciary Act of 
1925, the Judges' Bill, gave the Supreme Court discretionary jurisdiction through the writ 
of certiorari. This new jurisdiction extended the authority of the Supreme Court from 
answering constitutional questions, to also deciding what constitutes a constitutional 
question is. 
The actions the justices of the early national period created precedents and 
statures that further defined the Judiciary's role as an equal branch of government. The 
45Pollack, Earl Warren, 218. 
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justices changed the circuit riding requirements, adopted new opinion writing practices, 
and established judicial review. Each of these steps strengthened the authority of the 
Supreme Court. The amended circuit riding requirements created an atmosphere 
friendlier to justice. The new style of opinions gave the Court a strong unified voice. 
Lastly, the establishment of judicial review put the Court on equal footing with the other 
branches of government. Each of these achievements helped strengthen the Court from a 
relatively weak tribunal to the Court today, which interprets the highest law in the land. 
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